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The Anthyphairetic Revolutions of the Platonic Ideas 
 
Stelios Negrepontis 
 
θεὰ σκέδασ' ἠέρα, εἴσατο δὲ χθών·  
Odusseia, Book XIII, line 352 
 
Abstract. In the present work Plato’s philosophy is interpreted as an imitation, a close 
philosophic analogue of the geometric concept of a pair of lines incommensurable in 
length only and of its (palindromically) periodic anthyphairesis. It is shown, by an 
examination of the Platonic dialogues Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus, 
that 
(a) a Platonic Idea  is the philosophic analogue of a dyad of lines incommensurable in 
length only,   
(b) the Division and Collection, the method by which humans obtain knowledge of a 
Platonic Idea,  is the philosophic analogue of the palindromically periodic 
anthyphairesis of this dyad, and 
(c) a Platonic Idea is One in the sense of the self-similarity induced by periodic 
anthyphairesis. 
 
A byproduct of the above analysis is that  
(d) Theaetetus had obtained a proof of the Proposition: The anthyphairesis of a dyad 
of lines incommensurable in length only is palindromically periodic.  
It is further verified that the concepts and tools contained in the Theaetetean Book X 
of the Elements suffice for the proof of the Proposition. 
 
Outline. According to the Philebus 16c a Platonic Idea is the mixture of the two 
principles Infinite (‘apeiron’) and the Finite (‘peras’) (Section 2). A key step to this 
interpretation is the discovery, that, according to  the Philebus 23b-25e, these two 
principles are close philosophic analogues of the concepts of finite and infinite 
anthyphairesis (commensurability and incommensurability, accordingly), 
described in Propositions 1-8 of Book X in Euclid’s Elements (Section 3).  
 
Since the components that enter in the mixing have so heavily a mathematical content, 
it is natural to try to locate first a mathematical mixture of commensurability and 
incommensurability. Set in this way, the answer lies in front of us  in the concept of 
incommensurability in length only of two lines a,b (Definitions 2, 3 in Book X of 
the Elements), a mixture of incommensurability (a, b) and commensurability (a2, b2
 
) 
(Section 4).  
The main bulk of the argument (Sections 5-12), consists  in showing that  a Platonic 
Idea is a mixture of the Infinite and the Finite in the sense that it is the philosophic 
analogue of a dyad of lines incommensurable in length only.  
 
In the Theaetetus 147d-148d, where the mixture, called ‘dunamis’, is introduced by 
Theaetetus, Plato gives an account of the incommensurabity proofs, initially by 
Theodorus and then by Theaetetus, of a, b in case a2=Nb2 for non-square N; but the 
mathematical result achieved by Theaetetus is couched in unclear philosophical terms, 
involving the crucial phrase on  
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the collection into One of powers (‘hai dunameis’, 147d7-8) infinite in multitude. 
Delicate arguments, that have totally escaped the attention of the scholars, show  
that the plural ‘hai dunameis’, employed in this description, is distributive, and 
that Theaetetus succeeded in Collecting into One every power separately that 
appeared infinite in multitude by Theodorus’ proof of incommensurability (Section 
5).  
 
Socrates, at the end of the Theaetetus passage, asks that Theaetetus imitate (‘peiro 
mimoumenos’, 148d4) his method in order to tackle the philosophic problem of 
knowledge of the Ideas (‘episteme’), and the imitation, the method of Division and 
Collection, by which ‘episteme’ is achieved, is presented in the sequel, Sophistes and 
Politicus, of the Platonic trilogy (Section 6).  
 
The distributive interpretation of the Theaetetus 147d7-8, the imitation of the resulting 
mathematical Division and Collection to produce the philosophical one, and the 
Platonic accounts of the philosophical Division and Collection lead to three 
plausibility arguments suggesting that Theaetetus mathematical achievement 
consisted in proving that every dyad of incommensurable in line only lines possess a 
periodic anthyphairesis, These plausibility arguments take us within striking 
distance from the modern theorem (established by the successive efforts of great 
mathematicians (including Fermat, Brouncker, Euler, Lagrange, Legendre, Galois): 
every pair of lines incommensurable in length only possesses (palindromically) 
periodic anthyphairesis (Section 7). 
 
How would Theaetetus prove periodicity in anthyphairesis? Reasonable arguments 
lead to the conclusion that, unlike the Pythagoreans and unlike Theodorus, Theaetetus  
had created a theory of ratios of magnitudes (exactly the one reported in the Topics 
158b-159a), based on equal anthyphairesis. In such a theory the most natural way of 
proving periodicity is by means of the Logos Criterion (Section 8). 
 
The most decisive arguments, confirming the plausibility arguments developed in 
Section 7, are contained in the analytic examples of Division and Collection  in the 
Sophistes and the Politicus. The knowledge of the Angler (Section 9) and of the 
Sophist (Section 10) in the Sophistes, paradigms of Division and Collection, are 
shown to be close philosophic analogues of anthyphairesis, achieving periodicity by 
the Logos criterion (the second one by employing the fundamental analogy of the 
divided line of the Politeia 509d-510b). But, and this is nothing short of astounding, 
in the Politicus the knowledge of the Statesman is achieved by a further refinement 
of the method, imitating not just periodicity but in fact palindromic periodicity 
(Section 11). Thus Plato makes sure that Theaetetus has proved the full 
palindromicity theorem, stated in Section 7. The Double Measurement in the 
Politicus 283a-287b philosophical mixture (even manages to take a form similar to 
the mathematical one (Section 12). 
 
On the basis of the plausibility arguments, but mostly on the basis of the evidence 
provided by the divisions and Collections in the Sophistes and Politicus, we then have 
little choice but to conclude that Theaetetus had in fact proved  the full palindromic 
periodicity theorem. The introduction of the ‘apotome’ (Proposition 73) and 
‘binomial’ (Proposition 36) lines and their conjugacy (Propositions 112-114) in 
Book X. provide the necessary tools for a natural reconstruction (Section 13).  
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Several Platonists, in perplexed puzzlement, rejected the notion that a Platonic Idea 
could be a mixture of the infinite and the finite and divisible, in fact ad infinitum, 
since such properties appear to preclude the sine qua non of a Platonic Idea, its 
Oneness. What they have failed to understand is that an entity divisible, but in endless 
revolution and periodicity while being divided, is an entity possessing the most 
satisfying and internally determined concept of Oneness, self-similarity (Section 14). 
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1. The basics of Plato’s philosophy 
 
According to Plato’s philosophy 
(a) every intelligible Platonic idea is a One, a monad, always the same, not subject to 
generation or destruction (e.g. Symposium 210e-211b, Phaedo 78d,80b, Philebus 
15b1-4); 
(b) Ideas are knowable (‘episteme’) to humans with the method of Division and 
Collection (Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Philebus, Phaedrus, Parmenides); and 
(c) The sensibles are subject to generation, destruction, and continued change. 
Sensibles participate in the intelligibles (e.g. Phaedo 100c-e). 
 
It is the purpose of this paper is to examine the intelligible, Platonic Ideas, and to 
show that Ideas and their knowability must be understood as close philosophic 
analogues of commensurable in power only dyads of lines and their periodic 
anthyphairesis1. We are not concerned in the present work with a corresponding 
interpretation of the sensibles.2
  
  
                                                 
1 Relevant definitions and concepts are given in Section 6. 
2 The Platonic description of the sensibles (in the Timaeus), and their participation in the Platonic Ideas 
are to be found in the anthyphairetic approximations (the modern convegents of the continued 
fractions) of commensurability in power only (cf. Negrepontis [N, 2005] (Section F) for an outline). 
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2. Every Platonic Idea is the Philebean mixture of the infinite and the 
finite (Philebus 16c) 
According to the Philebus, each of the Platonic Ideas is a mixture of the Philebean 
infinite and the Philebean finite.3
 
 
Philebus 16c 
Socrates. One which is easy to point out, but very difficult to follow for through it all the inventions of 
art have been brought to light. See this is the road I mean. 
Protarchus. Go on what is it? 
Socrates. A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was tossed down from some divine source through the 
agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming fire; and the ancients, who were better than we and 
lived nearer the gods, handed down the tradition that all the things which are ever said to exist (‘ton 
aei legomenon einai’) are consist of  one and many and have inherent in them the finite and the 
infinite (‘peras de kai apeirian en autois sumphuton echonton’).  
 
Philebus 23c-d 
Socrates. We said that God revealed in the universe two elements, the infinite and the finite, did we 
not? 
Protarchus. Certainly. 
Socrates. Let us, then, assume these as two of our classes, and a third, made One by combining (‘hen 
ti summisgomenon’) these two.  
 
Philebus 25b 
Socrates.Well, what shall we say is the nature of the third class, made by combining (‘to meikton’) 
these two? 
 
Thus, we will be able to discover the nature of Platonic Ideas and Beings, if we 
understand the meaning of the terms ‘Philebean finite’, ‘Philebean infinite’ and 
‘Philebean mixture’ of infinite and finite. 
 
  
                                                 
3 Some scholars, e.g. Cherniss [Ch, 1945], Ryle [Ry, 1966], do not think that ‘ta aei legomena einai’ 
refer to the Platonic Ideas; this position is to be understood within a general view that, Plato’s repeated 
dithyrambic descriptions of Division and Collection not withstanding, downgrades the method. Cf. 
Sections 12. 5 and 14.4-5 below. 
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3. The Philebean infinite and finite is the philosophic analogue of the 
incommensurability and commensurability, respectively (Philebus 
23b-25e) 
 
During the fall semester of 1996, while being Visiting Professor at the Mathematics 
Department of Cyprus University, I discovered, in the Platonic dialogue Philebus 
23b-25e, the first hard evidence that Plato’s philosophy was related to the geometric 
concept of anthyphairesis, found in the Elements (finite Euclidean algorithm for 
numbers in Book VII, finite or infinite anthyphairesis of magnitudes in Book X). I 
gave a lecture on this subject at the Philosophy Department of Cyprus University on 
December 2, 1996, with the characteristic title:  
 
‘A Mathematician Reads the Philebus’.  
 
An extended version of my lecture has appeared in [N, 1999].In the period 1996-2000 
that followed, I wrote several versions of this discovery and gave a large number of 
lectures on it. My interpretation of the Philebean infinite and finite is adequately 
described in the two extracts I supply below (translated from the Greek) from two 
publications. 
 
In the paper [N, 2000] (pp. 16-20), I write on the Philebus 23b-25e): 
 
‘1a. The Dichotomy of Infinite and Finite in Euclid. 
In the definitions 1 and 2 of Book X of the Elements a fundamental dichotomy s described. We 
can state this dichotomy as follows: 
We consider as Whole the set R of all ordered pairs (a,b) of line segments… with a>b. The 
first fundamental dichotomy of R (given by definition 1) is between  the class A of all 
incommensurable pairs and the class P of all commensurable pairs.. 
Propositions 1-8 of Book X are devoted to the proof of the following basic characterizations: 
(a) P=the class…of all (a,b) in R with finite anthyphairesis=the class of all pairs (a,b) in R 
that are ‘as number to number’, and 
(b) A= the class…of all (a,b) in R with infinite anthyphairesis=the class of all pairs (a,b) in R 
that are ‘not as number to number’. 
 
1b. The Dichotomy of Infinite and Finite in Plato. 
In passage 23b-25e of the Platonic dialogue Philebus there is a treatment of the Platonic 
dichotomy of infinite and finite. 
The Whole, to which the the platonic dichotomy applies, consists of all ordered pairs of the 
type (more, less). Such a pair is infinite in case the relation (more, less) is renewed at every 
stage of the process and finite if the relation (more,less) stops or ends at some stage. 
And it is finite, Plato informs us further, if each element of the pair (more, less) is a quantity 
(with respect to some measure) (cf. anonymous scholion 39 in Book X of the Elements), 
alternately, if the elements of the  pair are as number to number,  alternatively,  if the pair is 
commensurable. 
It becomes evident (after a somewhat more extended and detailed analysis into which we have 
no time to enter) that the Platonic Infinite (resp., the Platonic Finite) coincides with the 
Euclidean Infinite A (resp., the Euclidean Finite P)’4
                                                 
4 In the newspaper Avgi there was an extensive presentation-interview of my interpretation of Plato’s 
philosophy in three Sunday issues (July 30, August 6 and 13, 200) [Av, 2000]. In this presentation 
(July 30, 2000) I write on the Philebus 23b-25e:  
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 In [N, 2005] I published a detailed  account of my interpretation, where I have added 
two new items, in relation to the previous publications:  
(a) I have included Proclus’ Commentary to Euclid 5,11-7,12, confirming my 
interpretation of the Philebean principles of Finite and Infinite in terms of 
incommensurability and commensurability, respectively; and  
(b) I have attempted the rather ambitious argument of showing directly, not through 
its opposition to the Finite, that Philebean Infinite is the  philosophic analogue of 
infinite anthyphairesis. 
 
For (a) I write in [N, 2005]:  
 
‘Proclus’ anthyphairetic account of the Philebean principles of the Finite and the 
Infinite…  
 Full confirmation of our interpretation is supplied by Proclus, in his work Comments 
to Euclid 5,11-7,12, where it is stated  
(i) that the Philebean principle of the Finite is the cause of commensurability of 
magnitudes (7,1-5), and  
(ii) that the Philebean principle of the Infinite is the cause of incommensurability of 
magnitudes (6,19-21).  
These comments connect in a causal relation the Philebean philosophical Infinite with 
the mathematical concept of incommensurability, which we know to be equivalent, 
according to propositions X.2-3 of the Elements, with the mathematical concept of  
infinite anthyphairesis, so that the cause of mathematical infinite anthyphairesis is the 
Philebean principle of the Infinite; and also it connects in a similar relation the 
Philebean philosophical Finite with the mathematical concept of commensurability,  
which we know to be equivalent, according to propositions X.1-8 of the Elements, 
with the mathematical concept of finite anthyphairesis, so that the cause of 
mathematical finite anthyphairesis is the Philebean principle of the Finite.’ 
 
Note on existing interpretations. To the best of my knowledge the anthyphairetic 
interpretation of the Philebus 23b-25e is completely original, as no existing 
interpretation relates it with anthyphairesis. In fact, some of the classical 
interpretations, by Hackforth [Ha, 1945], G. Striker [St, 1970], Gosling [Go, 1975], 
D. Frede [FrD,1992], S. Delcomminette [De, 2006]  (to name just a few), make no 
correlation to Euclid’s Elements, Book X or to anthyphairesis; and, the recent volume, 
edited by J. Dillon and L. Brisson [DB, 2010], with contributions of some 52 papers 
by 42 scholars on various aspects of the Philebus, contains not even one direct or 
                                                                                                                                            
‘In Euclid we have a detailed description of the dichotomy between finite and infinite anthyphairesis… 
The infinite and the finite occur everywhere in Plato, but the most revealing text is undoubtedly the 
passage in the Philebus 23b-25e, where Plato reproduces in a very faithful manner, essentially the same 
terms that Euclid uses in Book X of the Elements in order to describe the fundamental dichotomy 
between infinite and finite anthyphairesis. The only object that may be described by the terms: finite, 
rest, end of every opposition, commensurable, each a quantity, as number to number, as measure to 
measure is the finite anthyphairesis’. 
 8 
indirect reference to anthyphairesis or to Book X of the Elements or to Proclus’ 
Comments on the Philebean infinite and finite.5
 
 
3a. In section 12.1 below we will make use of the following statement from the 
Philebus: 
 
‘Every pleasure (‘hedone’), or more precisely every dyad (pleasure and pain) 
(‘hedone kai lupe’), is an infinite’. 
 
 
Philebus 27e 
Socrates. Is pleasure and pain a finite, or are they among the things which admit of more and less? 
Philebus. Yes, they are among those which admit of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be 
absolute good if it were not infinite in multitude and in the more.  
 
Philebus 31a 
Socrates. Let us, then, remember … that pleasure was itself infinite and belonged to the class 
which, in and by itself, has not and never will have either beginning or middle or end. 
 
Philebus 41d 
Socrates. And have we not also said and agreed and settled something further? 
Protarchus. What? 
Socrates. That both pleasure and pain admit of the more and less and are of the class of the 
infinite. 
Protarchus. Yes, we have said that, certainly. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
5 I presented my anthyphairetic interpretation of the Philebus 23b-25e (and of other Platonic passages), in the 
seminar on Philosophy at the National Technical University (Athens), co-directed by V. Karasmanis, on May 
1999.  
It was recently brought to my attention that V. Karasmanis has  published a paper (entitled Continuity and 
Incommensurability in Ancient Greek Philosophy and Mathematics, in the volume edited by G. Anagnostopoulos, 
Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian Studies: Essays in Honor of Gerasimos Santas, Philosophical Studies Series, 
volume 117, Springer 2011, p. 389-399),  where he is (a) presenting an interpretation of the Philebus 23b-25e in 
terms of anthyphairesis, using the arguments I have already employed, but (b) making no reference to my original 
(1996) discovery, to my publications [N, 1999], [N, 2000], [N, 2005] or to published accounts [Av, 2000], and to 
my May 1999 lecture in his seminar on this interpretation. 
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4. The Theaetetean mixture of  
commensurable and incommensurable  
(Theaetetus 147e2-b3, Elements, def. 2, 3 in Book X) 
 
After this identification, the question is what might be the Philebean mixture of the 
(Philebean) infinite and the (Philebean) finite. If we succeed in identifying the 
nature of the Philebean mixture, we will be able to understand the meaning of the 
Platonic Idea. 
The two Philebean principles infinite and finite are the philosophic analogues, the 
imitations of the geometric concepts incommensurability and commensurability, 
correspondingly. It is then natural to conjecture that  
the philosophical Philebean mixture of the Philebean infinite and Philebean finite 
will be the philosophic analogue, the imitation of a suitable geometric mixture of 
commensurability and incommensurability.  
Thus it is natural to look for a mixture of commensurability and 
incommensurability. 
In definitions 2 and 3 of Book X of the Elements the central concept of Book X of 
the Elements is introduced, the commensurability in power only of two lines, 
equivalently the incommensurability in length only of two lines. 
‘(Two) straight-lines are commensurable in power (‘dunamei summetroi’) when the 
squares on them are measured by the same area, but (are) incommensurable (in 
power) when no area admits to be a common measure of the squares on them’.  
Incommensurable in length only, equivalently commensurable in power only, 
are two line segments a and b such that a, b are incommensurable and their squares 
a2, b2
Incommensurability in length only is indeed a geometric mixture of 
incommensurability and commensurability. 
 are commensurable. 
 
The concept is due to Theaetetus, as is not the case with the concepts 
commensurable/incommensurable, which are Pythagorean in origin. The 
circumstances of the introduction this concept by Theaetetus are related to us by 
Plato in the Theaetetus 147d3-148b4, a difficult and ill understood passage that 
nevertheless needs be clarified. 
 
Indeed, Theaetetus introduced the concept of power (‘dunamis’), by definition a 
line a, such that a is incommensurable in length (‘mekei ou summetrous’) to the one 
foot line b, but whose square a2 is commensurable (‘tois d’ epipedois ha dunantai 
[summetrous]’) to the square foot b2 
 
(147e2-148b4).  
We will refer to a pair of lines a and b, such that a, b is incommensurable and a2, b2
 
 
commensurable as the Theaetetean mixture of commensurability and 
incommensurability. 
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5. The distributive plural argument: Every dunamis (Theaetetean 
mixture) possesses division and collection, not all powers 
collectively (Theaetetus 147d3-148b4) 
 
In the Theaetetus 147d3-148b4 Plato relates to us not only the fact that Theaetetus 
introduced the notion of dunamis (Theaetetean mixture), but also the reason and the 
circumstances for doing so. During a lesson on some initial quadratic 
incommensurabilities taught by Theodorus, Theaetetus (and his companion) had  a 
genial idea that that led him first to the introduction of the concept of power 
(dunamis, the Theaetetean mixture), and second to the proof of a mathematical 
result, relying on the concept of power, whose statement however, as given by 
Plato, involves the ‘collection of the infinite multitude of powers into One’, 
unfortunately a statement mathematically unclear.  
 
Although the, admittedly difficult and delicate, passage in question is quite crucial, 
nevertheless it has been seriously misunderstood and compromised by most 
platonic scholars. 
The first step in clarifying Theaetetus mathematical result is to decide on a question 
of linguistics: by the statement  
 
‘ai dunameis ephainonto apeiroi to plethos’ (147d7-8) 
 
does Plato want  
(i) to say that the ‘dunameis’ apeeared to be apeiroi to plethos’ as a totality, as a set, 
as it would appear more natural, or  
(ii) to say that every power appeared to be infinite in multitude, as it would appear 
less natural (at least to our modern ears).  
 
Technically we might say that the question is if the plural ‘hai dunameis’ is 
distributive (case (ii)),  
or collective (case (i)).6
The passage has been interpreted collectively essentially by all scholars, including 
Knorr, Burnyeat. (Cf. Note in this Section below)  
  
We will argue now that, on the contrary, Plato means to read the plural in a 
distributive manner; in which case, the Theaetetus 147d3-148b3 passage is to be 
rendered as follows: 
 
(147d3-6) Theodorus in his lesson had shown (‘apophainon’) that if a ia line such 
that a2=Nb2
 
, where N is one of the non-square numbers from N=3 to N=17 and b is 
the line of length one foot, then a is incommensurable in length (‘mekei ou 
summetroi’) to the one foot line; 
(147d7-e3) Because, as a result of Theodorus lesson, it appeared that every power was 
divided into an infinite multitude of parts (‘apeiroi to plethos’) (147d7-8), 
Theaetetus and his companion had the idea and in fact succeeded in collecting every 
power into One (‘sullabein eis hen’) (147d8-e3);  
 
                                                 
6  For example: ‘the policemen wear uniform’ is a collective plural; ‘the policemen have surrounded 
the block’ is a distributive plural. 
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(147e3-148b3) Theaetetus succeeded in the (Division and) Collection into One of 
every power by realizing that every power (‘dunamis’) is precicely a line segment 
incommensurable in length only to the one foot line, the Theaetetean mixture of 
incommensurability and commensurability. 
 
Support for this distributive interpretation is based on the following three pieces of 
evidence, which have been ignored by all scholars so far 7
 
: 
[A] The plural about powers is distributive  
in the first occurrence (‘[dunameis] mekei ou summetroi te podiaia’, 147d4-5), and  
in the third occurrence (‘[dunameis]…mekei men ou summetrous ekeinais, tois d’ 
epipedois ha dunantai [summetrous]’, 148b1-2), 
since every power is incommensurable or commensurable to the one foot, and not all 
the powers together; 
hence it is natural to conclude that the plural about powers  
in the second in between occurrence (hai dunameis apeiroi to plethos, 147d7-8)  
is distributive as well. 
 
[B] Scholia in Platonem [Theaetetus 162e6-7] (SIP) 
 
Plato comments briefly on Theodorus’ demonstrations in the following Theaetetus 162e6-7 
passage:  
 
‘Imagine how utterly worthless Theodorus or any geometer would be if he were prepared to rely on 
probability to do geometry.’ 
 
With this passage (162e6-7), Plato clearly refers to the Theodorus’ incommensurability 
demonstrations mentioned earlier in the Theaetetus 147d3-e1, the only Theodorus 
demonstrations mentioned in the Theaetetus. An interesting  commentary of the 162e6-7, 
found in the anonymous work Scholia in Platonem (abbreviated SIP), runs  as follows:  
 
‘If we accept the judgement of the many as the dominant one in geometry, we would be ridiculous to 
claim that  
[SIP1] maginitudes are incommensurable to each other,  
and that  
[SIP2]  the finite line is divisible ad infinitum (‘diaireten eis apeiron’), 
and the like (‘ta toiauta’).’ 
 
The following reading of the SIP commentary is suggested:  
Theodorus, when proving that each of the powers (of 3,5,…,17 feet) and the one foot 
line (the magnitudes of SIP) are incommensurable to each other ([SIP1], as in 
statement 147d1-3)), employed,  
not any considerations of probability (which would be worthless and make him 
ridiculous),  
but  logically impeccable  proofs (‘apodeixin de kai anagken’, 162e4-5) involving the 
division ad infinitum of each of these finite lines ([SIP2],  
so that every one of these lines, each power, is infinite in multitude, as in statement 
147d7-8)). 
The reading leads to a distributive interpretation of ‘hai dunameis’ in 147d7-8. 
 
                                                 
7 In Section 6.3 below we will give a fourth argument in favor of distributivity of the plural. 
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[C] The Anonymi Commentarius in Platonis Theaetetum (ACIPT), possibly Eudorus, 
1st century BC8
[1] an infinity in general must be collected, if possible;
, lends strong support to the distributive interpretation. Indeed, 
commenting on the infinity arising from the ‘powers  infinite in multitude’, and their 
collection achieved by Theaetetus and his companion, in the Theaetetus 147d-148b 
passage, he makes the following statements: 
9
[2] a line admits of infinite either by (infinite) division, or by (infinite) increase;
 
10
[3] the collection
 
11 of an infinity in a line can be achieved by passing over to 
numbers;12
[4] a line infinite by increase cannot be collected by numbers;
 
13
[5] the collection of an infinity in a line can be achieved by passing over to numbers, 
because numbers are commensurable to each other;
 
14
[6] the collection of an infinity in a line is achieved by passing from the less clear 
magnitudes  to the more clear numbers
 
15, namely from incommensurables to 
commensurables, that is to ‘as number to number’16
 
.  
By statement [2] we conclude that  
[7] the plural in the expression ‘the powers infinite in multitude, as already suspected, 
is distributive and ‘every power  infinite in multitude’  is meant; 
 
by statement [4] and the fact that Theaetetus and companion succeeded in collecting 
the infinite in multitude powers, we conclude that  
[8] every power is infinite in power by division ad infinitum; 
 
by statements [3], [5], and [6] we conclude that 
[9] the infinity of every power is due to incommensurability; and, 
 
by statements [3], [5], [6], we conclude that  
[10] ‘collection into One’ concerns the infinite multitude of parts of a power brought 
about by Theodorus incommensurability proofs, and is made possible because a 
power is not just any line incommensurable in length, but a line whose square is 
commensurable, namely a Theaetetean mixture of commensurability and 
incommensurability..  
 
Even with the (novel) distributive reading of ‘hai dunameis’ in 147d7-8, still the 
meaning of the central term, ‘collection into One’, is not clear, as yet.  But it is clear 
                                                 
8 cf. Tarrant [Tar, 1985] 
9 ACIPT 37, 3-12 
10 ACIPT 36,45-48 (‘the lines admit of the indefinite either by increasing or by dividing them’). 
11 collection renders ‘perilambanein’ (as in the Theaetetus 148d6) (26,11; 37,5; 37,10; 37,29; 37,43; 
37,46; 45,48; 46,39), periorizein (42,32) and horizein (37,1; 37,11). 
12 ACIPT 36,48-37,3 ([and because the lines] are limited by numbers, Theaetetus and his companion 
passed over to numbers’); 42, 30-33  
13 ACIPT 37, 39-44 
14 ACIPT 26,13-18 (‘thus they came to number as a consequence of the fact that all the numbers are 
commensurable to each other’) 
15 ACIPT 32,1-4; 44,50-45,3 (‘from the less clear one must pass to the more clear as when passing 
from magnitudes to numbers’). Exactly the same point is made in the Scholion X.39 to the Elements. 
16 ACIPT 41,40-42,18 (in analogy to the description for cubes: ‘they came to the cubes’, as ’the solid 
itself is commensurable to the solid; for it has ratio, as number to number, while th sides are 
incommensurable’) 
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that it has to do with a proof of the incommensurability of powers (after all the 
original lesson by Theodorus was about incommensurability of powers, and 
Proposition X.9 of the Elements is credited to Theaetetus). The fact that Theodorus’ 
proof of incommensurability led him to a division ad infinitum certainly suggests an 
anthyphairetic approach to incommensurability, namely a proof employing 
Proposition X.2 of the Elements.17
 
 But we will not consider this evidence as yet 
conclusive, and we will not rely on it . The exact content of Theaetetus mathematical 
contribution will become clear later, in Sections 12 and 13. 
Note on existing interpretations. To the best of my knowledge the interpretation of 
the Theaetetus 147d-148b passage, based on a distributive reading of the sentence 
147d7-8 and based on arguments [A], [B], [C], above, is completely original. A 
preliminary version of this argument appeared in the Negrepontis-Tassopoulos paper 
[NT, 1212]. The crucial sentence is universally interpreted collectively, and not 
distributively, by all scholars.Thus 
 
Cornford [Co,1935], p.23, translates: ‘seeing that these square roots were evidently 
infinite in number’.  
 
Klein [Kl, 1977}writes (p.80): ‘Since the multitude of such incommensurable lines 
had appeared to Theaetetus and to young Socrates to be infinite, they had tried to find 
a way to encompass all of them in some unity,so that they could be called by one 
name.’ 
 
Sedley [Se, 2002] writes: ‘Theaetetus recounts how he and his fellow student the 
younger Socrates were set by Theodorus the task of generalizing over the infinitely 
many square areas with integer areas but irrational sides.’ 
 
Tschemplik [Tsc, 2008], p.161, writes: ‘Theaetetus already knew that he could not 
solve Socrates’ questions the same way that he solved the mathematical questions 
posed to him byTheodorus (148e). This fact indicates an early awareness about the 
difference between mathematics and philosophy.Rather than looking at 
Theodorus’s demonstrations and arriving at a solution to the problem of 
irrational numbers by formulating a hypothesis which comprehends all 
irrational numbers, dividing them into square and oblong numbers, Socrates is asking 
Theaetetus to examine his own activity, not just practiceit, when he is asking him to 
answer the question about knowledge.’ (p.161) 
It is interesting that the insistent exhortation for imitation of mathematics to 
philosophy is interpreted and perceived as a sign of difference between mathematics 
and philosophy. 
 
Stern [Ste, 2008] writes (p. 62): ‘Together, Theaetetus and young Socrates produce 
what Theodorus, who did not participate in the postlecture conversation, did not even 
attempt – specifically, a way of thinking of the infinite series of such numbers that 
                                                 
17 The proof of Proposition X.2 in the Elements makes use of Eudoxus’ condition def.4, Book V, of the Elements. 
For this reason Knorr [K] believes that it could not be in use by Theodorus. Nevertheless an elementary, not 
involving Eudoxus’ condition, proof of X.3 can be given with a simple argument, similar to the proof, of 
Proposition VI.1 of the Elements, suggested in Aristotle’s Topics 158 b 29-35. 
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gathers them into a unity. Theaetetus thus shows himself capable of performing the 
crucial act of understanding, gathering a many into a one.’ 
The statement makes very little sense. For a mathematician like Theaetetus to give a 
one name, dunamis, to all the incommensurable lines considered would be a triviality, 
not a significant mathematical discovery. For Plato, the collective unity of all these 
lines into a set, or a name, would be equally trivial, as he makes clear in the beginning  
of the Philebus 14d-e.18
 
 
Both Knorr  and Burnyeat translate the crucial sentence 147d7-8 in a collective, non-
distributive way: 
Knorr [Kn, 1975] (p.63): ‘Now this is what occurred to us: that, since we recognized 
the power to be unlimited in number, we might to collect them under a single name’; 
Burnyeat [Bu, 1978]: ‘Well, since the powers seemed to be unlimited in number, it 
occurred to us to do something on these lines: to try to collect the powers under one 
term by which we could refer to them all.’ 
  
But they are both somewhat uneasy about the meaning of the sentence, and they settle 
for a similar interpretation. We will look at Burnyeat’s treatment: 
‘The key sentence is 147d 7-e 1, which I render as follows:  
Since the dunameis were turning out to be unlimited in number, it occurred to us to  
attempt to collect them up into a single way of speaking [i.e., a formula or definition] 
of all these dunameis together.  
Theaetetus is recounting the thoughts suggested to himself and his companion by and  
during Theodorus' lesson, and the idea that there is an endless series of whole number  
squares (or sides of such squares) would hardly need to be prompted by a process as  
protracted as Theodorus' lesson. That there are an indefinite, perhaps infinite,  
number of squares with incommensurable sides, on the other hand, is precisely the  
hypothesis that would suggest itself as Theodorus proceeded from case to case  
proving more and yet more examples of incommensurability, perhaps by a method 
which could be endlessly reapplied. Therefore, it is likely that, in context, "all these 
dunameis refers to squares with incommensurable sides rather than to squares  
generally.’ 
We should point out that the fact that there are infinitely many powers is also obvious 
and not relate at all to Theodorus’ lesson, simce the incommensurability of the power 
for N=2, known to the Pythagoreans and considered known by Theodorus,  implies 
the incommensurability of the infinitely many powers for N=22n+1
  
 
, with n=1,2,….  
                                                 
18 Cf. Section 14. b2 below 
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6. Theaetetus 148d4-5: ‘peiro mimoumenos’ the Theaetetean 
Division & Collection towards the Platonic Division & Collection in 
the Sophistes and the Politicus  
 
The ‘distributive’ interpretation of the plural ‘hai dunameis’ in 147d7-8 opens the 
way for a meaningful understanding of But why was Plato interested for the 
Theaetetus mixture? It is not simply to eulogise Theaetetus; he has something more 
significant in mind. 
 
6.1. The Plan to imitate Theaetetus’ mathematical Division and Collection in 
philosophy 
 
(i) 145d6,  145e8-9 
Socrates, with a characteristic ironic understatement (‘micron de ti aporo’, 146d6) 
sets the basic question for the trilogy Theaetetos, Sophistes, and Politicus,  
how is it possible to obtain knowledge of a Platonic Idea (‘episteme’). 
 
(ii) 147c7-d1  
After some abortive attempts, Theaetetus realizes that  
Socrates’ question on the acquisition of knowedge of Platonic Ideas (‘episteme’)  
is similar (‘hoion’), relevant to  
his (and his companion) treatment of  the mathematical problem, conceived during 
Theodorus’ lesson on quadratic incommensurabilities, and which was described in 
Section 5.< Every dunamis (Theaetetean mixture) possesses division and collection 
(Theaetetus 147d3-148b4)>. 
 
(iii) 148b5-8 
Theaetetus further realizes that, even though his answer for collecting a power into 
one is similar to the problem about episteme of Platonic Beings, still he cannot give 
the precise same answer for episteme of Platonic Beings, perhaps because the concept 
of dunamis involves not only commensurability and incommensurability (concepts 
that can be expressed in philosophical terms of finite and infinite) but also of taking 
squares, so that the geometric concept of dunamis has no clear analogue in the realm 
of Platonic Beings.  
Thus one might consider, as in the Philebus later, that commensurability and 
incommensarability are really mathematical instances of the more comprehensive 
philosophical principles of finite and infinite, but still what sense is one to make in the 
more comprehensive philosophical  context  of squaring.19
 
 
(iv) 148c9-d2   
Socrates.Then you must have confidence in yourself (tharrei peri sauto), 
[148d] and try earnestly (prothumetheti) in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of 
knowledge as well as of other things. 
Theaetetus. If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light. 
148d4-7 
                                                 
19 The philosophical analogue of squaring is the double Measurement in the Politicus 283a-287b, cf. 
Section 12, below. 
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Socrates. Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—try to imitate (peiro 
mimoumenos) your answer about the powers (dunameis), and just as you embraced (perielabes) them 
in one kind (heni eidei), though they were many (pollas), try to designate the many forms of knowledge 
(tas pollas epistemas) by one Logos.  
 
Theaetetus suceeded in showing that each power, divided into an infinite multitude of 
parts by Theodorus, can be collected into One; Socrates is exhorting Theaetetus to 
imitate (‘peiro mimoumenos’) this process of Collection to the knowledge of 
Platonic Ideas. This imitation is realized in the two remaining dialogues of the 
trilogy; in the Sophistes and Politicus the method of obtaining knowledge of the 
platonic Ideas is the method of Division and Collection (‘diairesis kai sunagoge’), 
developed by the Eleatic Stranger in the presence of Theaetetus and his companion. 
This brings closer the description of Theaetetus mathematical achievement of 
collecting the divided ‘dunameis’ with the description, as Collection and Division, 
of the philosophical method of obtaining knowledge (‘episteme’) of platonic Ideas.  
 
6.2. The imitation realized with the method of Division and Collection in the 
dialogues Sophistes and Politicus 
 
The two last dialogues, Sophistes and Politicus, of the Platonic trilogy on the question 
of knowledge of the Platonic Ideas, are dedicated to the method of Division and 
Collection by means of which humans are able to obtain complete knowledge of the 
intelligible Platonic Ideas. Thus 
Theaetetus succeeded in collecting (sullabein, perilabein) the infinite multitude of the 
parts, into which a power had been divided, into One; and in the two succeeding 
dialogues Platonic Ideas become known by the method of Division ands Colletion.So 
the imitation of Mathematics to philosophy into which Socrates urged Theaetetus has 
been realized.  
Since philosophical Collection in the Sophistes and the Politicus is an imitation of the 
geometrical Colletion in the Theaetetus, we will attempt to understand the double 
meaning of Collection by studying the method in these two dialogues. This will be 
done in Sections 9,10,11, and 12. 
 
6.3. A fourth argument in favor of the distributive nature of the plural in the 
Theaetetus 147d7-8 
 
In the Sophistes 247d-248d Plato defines the Platonic Idea as a ‘dunamis’. The meaning of 
this definition will be explained briefly below in Section 14.4 (4). According to this definition 
the fundamental property of a Platonic Idea is that, in interaction, active or passive, 
with an opposite element, forming an indefinite dyad, it has the ‘power’, in fact the 
‘power to communicate’ with each other (252d3, 253a8, 253e1, 254b8, 254c5), in fact 
the ‘power for equalisation with each other’ (257b).  
 
Irrespetive of the precise meaning of the definition, Plato imitates here the term used 
in the Theaetetus 147d-148d for the mathematical ‘dunamis’. In the Sophistes the 
Division and Collection is a method for the acquisition of knowledge of a Platonic 
Idea, thus of a ‘dunamis’; it is certainly the case that every dunamis separately is 
Collected into One. This suggests again that in the Theaetetus the Collection of the 
‘dunameis’ (who were collected into One because they appeared to be infinitely 
many) is to be understood distributively, for each power separately.  
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7. Some Plausibility arguments suggesting periodic anthyphairesis 
 
The distributive interpretation of the Theaetetus 147d7-8, given in Section 6, and 
the resulting discussion about the nature of the imitation (Theaetetus 148d4-5) 
suggest some plausibility arguments that lead to periodic anthyphairesis. 
 
7.1. First plausibility argument: Theodorus’ and Theaetetus’ method of proof 
of incommensurability of the powers is anthyphairetic 
 
The fact that Theodorus’ proofs of incommensurability of some powers resulted in 
the division of each of the powers into an infinite multitude of parts (according to 
the distributive interpretation of Section 5) is not consistent with any other 
conceivable method save an anthyphairetic one, eventually employing Proposition 
X.2 of the Elements. And the fact that Theaetetus continued from there on, 
collecting all these infinitely many pieces into one, indicates that Theaetetus’ 
contribution was also anthyphairetic. 
 
7.2. Second plausibility argument: Theaetetus’ Collection leads to a complete 
knowledge of every ‘dunamis’ 
 
The method of Theodorus is Division, while that of Theaetetius Collection 
(described by the ideas ‘sullabein’ and ‘perilabein’); thus put together they deal 
with may be described as Division and Collection.  
On the other hand Socrates urges Theaetetus to try to imitate the mathematical 
Division and Collection for the philosophical problem of the acquisition of 
knowledge of the Platonic Ideas; and, in later in the trilogy, in the Sophistes and 
Politicus, the method by which klowledge of the Platonic Ideas is acquired is 
described as Division and Collection.  
Thus the philosophic, Platonic method of Division and Collection is an imitation of 
Theaetetus’ (Division and) Collection.  
 
The fact that the reason for Socrates interest in Theaetetus’ mathematical discovery is the 
quest for a method of acquiring knowledge of the Platonic Beings indicates that 
Theaetetus’ mathematical discovery about powers was not simply about a proof of their 
incommensurability but rather a method of acquiring knowledge of these powers. This 
again points to periodic anthyphairesis, since by periodic anthyphairesis of a power a 
complete knowledge of the power is indeed obtained, as indicated by the following 
theorem of modern mathematics. 
 
7.3. The theorem on the continued fraction expansion of quadratic irationals 
 
The following important theorem of modern mathematics (17th and 18th
 
 century) 
shows that the continued fraction expansion of a quadratic irrational provides 
complete knowledge of the quadratic irrational.  
Theorem20 (Fermat, Brouncker, Euler21, Lagrange22, Legendre, Galois23
                                                 
20 cf. Hardy & Wright [HW, 1938], Weil [W, 1984], Fowler [Fow, 1986]. 
).  
21 [E,1765] 
22 [Lag, 1769], [Lag, 1771] 
23 [Ga, 1829] 
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If N is a non-square natural number, then the continued fraction of √N is periodic, 
and in fact palindromically periodic, namely there are numbers n and m, k1,k2,…, 
kn-1, (kn), such that the sequence of successive quotients of the continued fraction of 
√N has the form 
[m, period (k1, k2,…, kn-2, kn-1, (kn), kn-1, kn-2,…,k2, k1,2m)]. 
 
The modern theory of continued fraction of a real number is the equivalent 
analogue of the anthyphairesis of a ratio of, say, line segments. The above theorem 
is stated equivalently as follows: 
 
Proposition. If two lines a and b are incommensurable in length only, namely form 
a Theaetetean mixture of incommensurability and commensurability, then the 
anthyphairesis of a to b is periodic, and in fact palindromically periodic. In fact, 
there are numbers n and m, k1, k2,…, kn-1, (kn), such that the sequence Anth(a,b) of 
successive quotients of the continued fraction of a to b has the form 
Anth(a,b)=[m, period (k1, k2,…, kn-2, kn-1, (kn), kn-1, kn-2,…,k2, k1,2m)]. 
 
Thus the anthyphairesis of the Theatetean  mixture provides complete, full 
knowledge of the Theaetetean .mixture 
 
7.4. Third plausibility argument: The cyclical-periodic nature of the method of 
Collection  
 
Theaetetus’ ‘collection into one’, a mathematically non-familiar notion, initially 
described by ‘sullabein eis hen’ (147d8), is also further described by ‘heni eidei 
perielabes’ (148d6), a term that has a cyclic and possibly periodic connotation. 
 
On the other hand there are several descriptions of the method of Division and 
Collection in Platonic dialogues, specifically in the Sophistes, Politicus, Phaedrus, 
and Philebus. It is remarkable that in every one of these descriptions, Collection is 
described Before embarking on a detailed study of the method we will stop to note 
that all the descriptions of the (Division and) Collection method imply a by an 
expression that denotes that it has a cyclical-periodic nature.24
 
    
                                                 
24Here is a list of such descriptions, indicating the term, in each description showing cyclical nature-
periodicity. 
Sophistes 235a10-c6 (‘[ton thera] perieilephamen en amphiblestrikoi tini’); 
Sophistes 253d1-e3 (‘pollas heteras allelon hupo mias exothen periechomenas’); 
Sophistes 264d12-265a2 (‘schizontes dichei to protethen genos, poreuesthai kata toupi dexia aei meros 
tou tmethentos, echomenoi tes tou sophistou koinonias, heos an autou ta koina panta perielontes, ten 
oikeian lipontes phusin epideixomen’); 
Politicus 283b1-c2 (‘perielthomen en kukloi pampolla diorizomenoi’); 
Politicus 285a4-b6 (‘tas de au pantodapas anomoiotetas…sumpanta ta oikeia entos mias homoiotetos 
herxas genous tinos ousiai peribaletai’); 
Politicus 286d6-287a6 (‘logon meke kai tas en kukloi periodous’); 
Philebus 15d4-8 (‘tauton hen kai polla hupo logon gignomena peritrechein pantei kath’ hekaston ton 
legomenon aei’). 
In Phaedrus 264e-266c the Division and Collection of the right Love is periodic by its opposition to the 
explicit non-periodicity of the left-sinister Love,  indicated bythe statement  ‘to ep’ aristera 
temnomenos meros, palin touto temnon ouk epaneken prin en autois’. (The sentence usually receives 
a different reading, in which periodicity is lost, e.g. Hackforth [Ha, 1945]). 
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8. The Logos Criterion for periodic anthyphairesis  
 
8.1. The Theaetetean theory of ratios of magnitudes  
 
Aristotle, in the passage 158-9 of the Topics, important for the history and 
reconstruction of Greek mathematics, informs us that before the theory of ratios of 
magnitudes that dominated in Euclidean geometry, and which is Eudoxus’ theory 
majestically presented in Book V of the Elements, there was a previous theory 
based on the  
 
Definition. If a,b are homogeneous magnitudes and b,d are homogeneous 
magnitudes then   
a/b=c/d if and only if Anth(a,b)=Anth(c,d) 
(where Anth(a,b) denotes the sequence of successive quotients of the anthphairesis 
of a to b). 
 
A theory of ratios based on this pre-Eudoxian definition would need Eudoxus’ 
condition def. 4 in Book V. of the Elements, and so would be historically untenable. 
(Knorr [Kn, 1975], appendix B, reconstructs such a theory (and as carefully noted 
by Knorr, the crucial Theorem 6, p. 338, the analogue of the fundamental Eudoxian 
Proposition V.8 of the Elements, makes essential use of the Eudoxus condition (V, 
def. 4).  There is however evidence, chiefly among some that this pre-Eudoxian 
theory applied only to a limited class of pairs of magnitudes (e.g. the rational lines 
wrt an assumed line in the sense of definition 3 of Book X of the Elements—hence 
the term ‘alogos’ for those ratios whose square is not commensurable), which was 
quite adequate for the purposes of quadratic incommensurabilities, and for which 
there is no need to an appeal to Eudoxus condition.  One anonymous coment in 
Scholia in Eucliden V.22 suggests that there was such an earlier restricted  
quadratic theory of magnitudes, and another (Scholia in Eucliden X.2) criticizes the 
general Eudoxian theory, clearly from a Platonic point of view and in favor of the 
earlier quadratic theory of ratios of magnitudes. 
It is generally accepted that the theory of ratios based on anthyphairesis is due to 
Theaetetus.  
 
8.2. The Logos Criterion for periodic anthyphairesis 
 
A natural consequence of Theaetetus’ definition of equality of ratios for magnitudes is the 
following 
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Proposition (Logos Criterion for the periodicity of an anthyphairesis).  
Let a,b be two line segments, with a>b, and anthyphairesis given as follows: 
a       = I0 b+ e1,                             with b>e1, 
b       = I1e1 +e2,                             with e1>e2, 
… 
en-1    = In en+ en+1,                         with en >en+1, 
 
en        = In+1 en+1+ en+2,                   with en+1>en+2, 
…   
em-1    = Im em+ em+1,                      with em >em+1, 
 
em       = Im+1 em+1+ em+2,                with em+1>em+2, 
        … 
       ……. 
 
and assume that there are indices n<m such that 
 
        en/en+1= em/em+1              (‘Logos Criterion’). 
 
Then the anthyphairesis of a to b is eventually periodic, in fact  
Anth(a, b)= [I0, I1,…, In, period(In+1, In+2, …, Im)]. 
 
Proof. By the Theaetetean definition of analogy, Anth(en, en+1)=Anth(em, em+1). 
But Anth (a,b)= 
[I0, I1,…, In, Anth(en, en+1)]=  
[I0, I1,…, In, In+1, In+2, …, Im, Anth(em, em+1)]= 
[I0, I1,…, In, In+1, In+2, …, Im, Anth(en, en+1)]= 
[I0, I1,…, In, In+1, In+2, …, Im, In+1, In+2, …, Im, Anth(em, em+1)]= 
…= 
Anth(a, b)= [I0, I1,…, In, period(In+1, In+2, …, Im)]. 
 
8.3. An abbreviated representation of the Logos Criterion  
 
We note that the Logos criterion is stated solely in terms of the remainders, and no 
use is made in its statement of the quotients. The Logos criterion can be adequately 
represented in the following abbreviated form: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    en-1 
 
 
 
   e2 
    en 
b     e1 
e3 
     en+1 
  a 
   em+1  em 
                                     
 
em-1 
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8.4. Example. The anthyphairesis of a to b with a2=19b2
We exhibit the logos criterion with the first power that Theodorus did not prove in 
his lesson to Theaetetus and his companion. 
  
 (i) The anthyphairesis of a to b 
 
a=4b+e1, με a1<b (whence e1=a-4b), (and b =2e1+ e2, e2<e1 (whence e2=9b-2a)); 
e1 = e2+ e3, e3<e2 (whence e3=3a-13b),(and e2=3e3+ e4, e4<e3 (whenc e4=48b-11a)), 
e3= e4+ e5, e5<e4 (whence e5=14a-61b), (and e4=2e5+ e6, e6<e5 (whence e6=170b-
39a)), 
e5 =8e6+ e7, e7<e6  (whence e7=326a-1421b). 
 
(ii) Verification of the Logos Criterion 
b/e1=e6/e7.  
(we simply verify that b.e7=b.(326a-1421b)=e1.e6=(a-4b).(170b-39a)). 
 
The Logos Criterion results in the full knowledge of the ratio a/b: 
Anth (a,b)= [4, period(2,1, 3,1,2,8)]. 
By Proposition X.2, of course it is concluded that a,b are incommensurable. 
 
(iii) Abbreviated representation of the Logos Criterion 
 
 
  
a 
e1=a−4b 
e3=3a−13b 
b 
e2=9b−2a 
e4=48b−11a e5=14a−61b 
e6=170b−39a e7=326a−1421b 
 b/e1=e6/e7 
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9. The Division and Collection of the Platonic Idea ‘the Angler’ in the 
Sophistes 218b-221c 
 
9.1. The Division of the ‘Angler’  
 
The method of Division and Collection, also called ‘Name and Logos’ (cf. Theaetetus 
201e2-202b5, Sophistes 218c1-5, 221a7-b2, 268c5-d5), is exemplified at the start of 
the Sophistes 218b-221c by the definition of the Being Angler. In the scheme below, 
we reproduce the binary division process which leads to the Angler.  
 
Table 9.1. The Division of the Angler (Sophistes 218b-221c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.2. Collection-Logos of the Angler 
 
The description of the Logos-Collection of the Angler is contained in the Sophistes 
220e2-221c3 passage (which we have divided into two parts [A] and [B] for the sake 
of convenience): 
[A] ‘Stranger: Then of striking which belongs to barb-hunting [A8], that part which 
proceeds downward from above (‘anothen eis to kato’),  
is called, because tridents are chiefly used in it, tridentry [B9],  
I suppose…. 
Stranger: The kind that is characterized by the opposite sort of blow, which is 
practised with a hook and strikes,... and proceeds  
from below upwards (‘katothen eis tounantion ano’),  
being pulled up by twigs and rods.  
By what name, Theaetetus, shall we say this ought to be called? 
Theaetetus: I think our search is now ended and we have found the very thing we set 
before us a while ago as necessary to find. 
Stranger: Now, then, you and I are  
only agreed about the name of angling,[A9] ’ (220e2-221b1) 
productive arts B1 
all activities with an art G 
A1 acquisitive arts  
A9  angling  
 
A2  coercive arts  
 
voluntary arts B2 
 fighting B3 A3  hunting  
hunting of lifeless things B4 
 land animal hunting B5 
A4 hunting of living things  
 
A5 water-animal hunting  
fowling B6 
A6  fishing  
 
hunting by enclosures B7 A7  striking  
A8  barb-hunting  
 
  fire hunting B8 
 tridentry B9   
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[B] ‘but we have acquired also a satisfactory ‘Logos’ of the thing itself. 
For (‘gar’)  
of art as a whole, half was acquisitive, 
and of the acquisitive, half was coercive,  
and of the coercive, half was hunting, 
and of hunting, half was animal hunting, 
and of animal hunting, half was water hunting,  
and of water hunting [A5] 
the whole part from below (‘to katothen tmema holon’) 
was fishing,[A6] 
and of fishing, half was striking, 
and of striking, half was barb-hunting,[A8] 
and of this [A8] 
the part in which the blow is pulled  
from below upwards (‘peri ten katothen ano’) was angling.[A9]’25
In [A], the opposing relation of Tridentry to Angling is carefully explained: all 
Fishing with a hook is divided into  
 (221b1-c3).  
Tridentry (=Fishing with a trident), which is described as 
Fishing with a hook with an art that proceeds from above downwards, and  
Angling (=Fishing with a rod), which is described as 
Fishing with a hook with an art that proceeds from below upwards. 
We have pushed Division all the way to the Angling; thus, we have certainly found 
‘the name’ of Angling.  
 
But now, in [B], it is claimed that ‘the Logos’ of the Angling has been found, too. 
The justification—the proof—that we have indeed found the Logos, too, is contained 
in the remainder of [B], since this remaining part of [B] starts with a ‘for’ (‘gar’), and 
this justification can be seen to consist of:  
(i) an accurate recounting of all the division-steps, abbreviated in the sense that of the 
two species into which each genus is divided, only the one that contains the Angler is 
mentioned, while the species opposite to it is omitted; 
(ii) a reminder that the last species, the angling, is characterised as the part of its 
genus that proceeds ‘from below upwards’; and, 
(iii) the ONLY new information (since (i) and (ii) are repetitions of things already 
contained in the Division and in [A]), which concerns the species of fishing, three 
steps before angling, and which informs us for the first time that this species is ‘the 
whole part from below’ of its genus. 
Since this is an abbreviated account, there is no explicit information on the species 
opposite to ‘fishing’—namely ‘fowling’, but since ‘fishing’ was described not simply 
as ‘the part from below’ of its genus, but emphatically as ‘the whole part from below’, 
it follows that the opposite species—‘fowling’—must be characterised as ‘the (whole) 
part from above’ of the same genus. In fact, there can be no other justification for the 
presence of the term ‘whole’ in the description of ‘fishing’ with a view to arguing that 
we have obtained ‘Logos’, except to indicate and imply this description for its 
opposite species, ‘fowling’. 
We recall that the part of [B] from the word ‘for’ (‘gar’) is explicitly a justification of 
the claim that we have succeeded in finding the ‘Logos’ of the Angling. We may then 
                                                 
25 Based on Plato, Theaetetus and Sophist, translated by H.N. Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1921. 
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ask: what is the ‘Logos’ of the Angler that reasonably results from such a 
justification? There can really be only one answer: the ‘Logos’ we are looking for is 
the equality of the ‘philosophic ratio’ of Tridentry to Angling, namely the equality of 
the ratio ‘of from above downwards to from below upwards’, to the ratio ‘of Fowling 
to Fishing’.  
Thus [9b] 
fowling B6/fishingA6= 
tridentry B9/Angling A9= 
from above downwards/from below upwards. 
Since the species Tridentry and Angling forms a pair of opposite species, and the 
species Fowling and Fishing form another pair of opposite species in the Division 
Scheme for the Angler, the resulting ‘Logos’ bears a most uncanny similarity to the 
Logos Criterion for the periodicity of the anthyphairesis of geometric magnitudes, and 
of geometric powers in particular. 
 
9.3. The Division and Collection of the Angler 
 
The Division and Collection of the Angler thus takes the following form: 
 
Table 9.3. Division and Collection of the Angler (Sophistes 218b-221c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus the Division and Collection of the Angler consists of the Division, described in 
a, which is analogous to the abbreviated anthyphairetic model, as given in 1a, and of 
the Logos, described in b, analogous to the Logos Criterion for periodicity for 
geometric anthyphairesis established in Section 5. 
 
  
A9  angling  
 
 productive arts B1 
all activities with an art G 
A1 acquisitive 
t   A2  coercive arts  voluntary arts B2 
fighting B3 A3  hunting  
 
hunting of lifeless things B4 
land animal hunting B5 
A4  hunting of living things  
A5  water-animal hunting  
 
fowling B6 A6  fishing  
 
hunting by enclosures B7 A7  striking  
 
A8  barb-hunting  fire hunting B8 
 tridentry B9 
 fowling B6/fishing A6 
                = 
tridentry B9/angling A9 
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10. The Division and Collection of the Platonic Idea ‘the Sophist’ in 
the Sophistes 234e-236d & 264b-268d 
 
It now appears that the Division and Collection of a Platonic Idea—and the Angler is 
certainly a lowly paradigm of a Platonic Idea—is very much like the anthyphairetic 
Division and the Logos Criterion of a geometric ‘power’. When Socrates expressed, 
in the Theaetetus 145c7-148e5, his exhortation to imitate the geometric situation, it 
seems that he meant a much closer imitation that anybody has thus far suspected! But 
before proceeding on to wide-ranging conclusions, it would be prudent to examine 
whether the Division and Collection of the Sophist, in the Sophistes 264b-268d, has 
the same kind of structure and, in particular, whether there is a similar type of 
‘Logos’. So we shall take a look at the Division and Collection of the Sophist. 
 
10.1. The Division of the Sophist  
 
The Division for the Sophist follows the same pattern as the Division of the Angler, 
starting with a Genus, in this case ‘all the productive arts’, proceeding by binary 
division of each Genus to two species, where the next Genus is that species of the 
previous step in the Division that contains the entity to be defined, in this case the 
Sophist, and ending with the division-step that produces the Sophist as a species. The 
whole division scheme is as follows: 
          Table 10.1. Division of the Sophist (Sophistes 264b-268d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.2.  The fundamental analogy in the Divided Line of the Politeia 509d-510b and 
the Logos criterion-Collection of the Sophist  
 
We will now prepare the ground for the Logos-Collection of the Sophist. The 
fundamental analogy in the Divided Line of the Politeia 509d-510b plays a central 
role in the Logos Criterion of the Sophist. Here is the passage: 
 
 
  C7 sophist 
productive B1  A1 acquisitive 
   B1 productive arts 
 divine productive arts D1 
   C1 human productive arts 
   art of making real things D2  C2 art of making images  
   likeness-making arts D3 
 C3 fantastic art 
  art produced by instruments D4 
C4 mimetic art 
   mimetic art with knowledge D5 
C5 mimetic art with opinion 
  simple imitator D6 
C6 dissembling imitator  
   popular orator D7 
G all arts 
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‘Conceive then, said I, as we were saying, that there were two entities, and that 
 one of them is sovereign over 
the intelligible order and region 
and the other over 
the world of the eyeball 
 
…You surely apprehend the two types, 
the visible (‘horaton’)  
 and the intelligible (‘noeton’) 
…Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided into two unequal sections 
and cut each section again in the same ratio (‘ana ton auton logon’) 
(the section, that is, of the visible  
 and that of the intelligible order), 
and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative 
 clearness 
and obscurity  
you will have, as 
one of  
the sections of  
the visible world, 
images (‘eikones’). 
By images  
I mean, first, 
shadows, and their 
reflections  
in water and on 
surfaces of dense, 
smooth and bright 
texture, and 
everything  
of that kind… 
  
 As the second 
section assume  
that of which this is 
a likeness  
or an image  
(‘ho touto eoike’),  
that is, the animals 
about us and all 
plants and the 
whole class of 
objects  
made by man… 
 
Would you be willing to say, said I, that the division in respect of 
 truth 
or the opposite  
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 (‘aletheia te 
kai me’)  
is expressed by the proportion:  
as is 
the opinable (‘doxaston’)  
 to the knowable (‘gnoston’) 
so is 
the likeness 
(‘to homoiothen’) 
  
 to that of which  
it is a likeness 
(‘to ho omoiothe’)? 
 
I certainly would.’26 
 
This analogy in the Politeia Divided Line is rendered as follows: 
Let L be a line (segment),  
and divide the line L into two unequal sections,  
say 
 A 
and B,  
with 
 A  
representing the intelligible domain, 
and B  
the visible, or rather the sensible, domain. 
 
(Incidentally, the construction of the division of a line segment into a given ratio is 
contained in Proposition VI.10 of the Elements). 
 Then divide  
section A 
into two sections, say 
  C 
 and D,  
and divide  
section B 
into two sections, say 
 
 E  
and F,   
in such a way that B/A=D/C=F/E. Further, 
F  
represents 
the images 
  
in the sensible domain B,  
                                                 
26 Based on Plato, The Republic, translated by P. Shorey, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, 
Mass.,1935. 
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 and E 
the entities 
 
in the sensible domain B  
to which 
 
these are images,   
 i.e.  
the real entities  
 
in the sensible domain B.  
 Also the intelligible domain A 
is identified with 
the domain of knowledge, 
and the sensible domain B 
is identified with 
the domain of opinion. 
 
Hence the following proportion holds: 
The ratio of the opinable B to the knowable A  
is equal to  
the ratio of the images F to the real entities E. 
 
This, then, is the fundamental analogy of the Divided Line in the Politeia 509d-510b: 
 
the opinable/the knowable = the likeness/that of which it is a likeness. 
 
Therefore the Logos Criterion is now immediately recognised: 
the art of making real things D2/ the art of making images C2 =  
mimetic art with knowledge D5/mimetic art with opinion C5.  
 
 10.3. The next two Logoi of the Division and Collection of the Sophist analogous 
to the geometrical ratios of periodic anthyphairesis.  
 
The definition of the Sophist presents an additional feature that ties it even closer to 
the mathematical model: there are two Logoi after the Logos Criterion, and if the 
mathematical anthyphairetic model is indeed followed, we would expect to have two 
further equalities of Logoi: namely the logos of the third step should be equal to the 
ratio of the sixth division-step, and the logos of the fourth division-step should be 
equal to the ratio of the seventh and final division-step.  
 
(c1) The equality of the third and sixth ratios of the Division of the Sophist. In the 
third division-step, the Genus ‘humanly produced images’ is divided into two species,  
‘Stranger: I see the likeness-making art (‘eikastiken’) as one part of [the image-
making art]. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by 
following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, 
besides, the appropriate colors to each part.’ (235d6-e2);    
‘Stranger: Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an 
unfavorable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to 
resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works 
adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance? 
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Theaetetus: Certainly.’ (236b); 
‘Stranger: And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness (‘phantasma 
all’ ouk eikona’), the most correct name we could give would be "fantastic art," 
(‘phantastiken’) would it not? 
Theaetetus: By all means. 
 Stranger: These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art     (‘eidolopoiikes’) 
that I meant, the likeness-making (‘eikastikes’) and the fantastic (‘phantastikes’).’ 
(236c3-7);  
‘Stranger: We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making 
class (‘eidolourgikes’), the likeness-making (‘eikastikon’) and the fantastic 
(‘phantastikon’)’19
 
 (266d8-9). 
In the sixth division-step, described in 267e7-268a8, the Genus opinionated-imitator 
is divided into the two species, ‘the simple’ (‘haploun’) and ‘the dissembling’ 
(‘eironikon’) opinionated-imitator, the simple imitators being those who  
‘think they know that about which they have only opinion’,  
while the ‘dissembing’ are those who  
‘because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect 
and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to 
know’. 
 
Thus the simple imitators do not distort their opinion, but rather express a likeness of 
their opinion, while the dissemblers distort and disguise their opinion behind a false 
appearance. Therefore we have 
 
Proposition. The ratio of the third step in the Division of the Sophist, namely the 
ratio of the likeness-making arts to the phantastic arts, is equal to the ratio of the 
sixth step in the Division of the Sophist, namely the ratio of the simple imitator to 
the dissembling imitator. 
 
(c2) The equality of the fourth and seventh ratios. In the fourth division-step, 
described in 267a1-b3, the Genus, fantastic arts, is divided into two species, as 
follows: 
‘Stranger: Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art. 
Theaetetus: How? 
Stranger: One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the 
producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument. 
Theaetetus: What do you mean? 
Stranger: When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his 
own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called 
mimetic.’
Thus, in mimetic art the instrument of imitation is the imitator himself, while in the 
nameless opposite art the instrument of imitation is other than the imitator. 
19 
In the seventh division-step, described in 268a9-c4, the dissembler is divided into the 
demagogue and the sophist, the demagogue being  
‘one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude’,  
while the sophist is someone  
‘who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with 
him to contradict himself.’ 
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Thus, he who listens to a dissembler is deceived, if that dissembler is a demagogue, 
and contradicted not by himself but by another instrument of deceit (namely the 
demagogue himself), while if the dissembler is a sophist, the listener is forced by the 
sophist to himself become the instrument of deceit. 
Thus we have: 
 
Proposition. The ratio of the fourth step in the Division of the Sophist, namely the 
ratio of the imitator who uses other instruments of imitation to the imitator who 
is himself the instrument of imitation  
is equal to the ratio of the seventh step in the Division of the Sophist, namely the 
ratio of the demagogue, whose listener is contradicted and deceived not by 
himself but by another, to the sophist, whose listener is forced to be contradicted 
and deceived by himself. 
 
Propositions (c1) and (c2) provide powerful additional evidence in favor of the 
anthyphairetic interpretation of Division and Collection.  
 
10.4. The Division and Collection of the Sophist. The complete Division and 
Collection of the Sophist can thus be summarised in the following 
Table 10.4. Division and Collection of the Sophist (Sophistes 264b-268d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, we have full confirmation for the anthyphairetic meaning of Logos that we 
proposed in the Division and Collection of the Angler. This time, the Logos is not of 
the simple-minded, obvious type that appeared in the definition of the Angler (from 
above downwards/from below upwards), but of a more sophisticated and 
philosophical kind, playing a central role in the dialectics of the Politeia27
 
. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 The correlation of the Politeia ratio in the divided line with the Division and Collection of the 
Sophist in the Sophistes is hinted at by Proclus in eis Politeian 1,290,7-10. 
art of making real things D2/ 
art of making images C2 
                   = 
mimetic art with knowledge D5/ 
mimetic art with opinion C5 
 
G all arts 
   art of making real things D2 
productive B1  A1 acquisitive 
   B1 productive arts 
 divine productive arts D1   C1  human productive arts 
    C2  art of making images  
        likeness-making arts D3    C3  fantastic art 
  C4 mimetic art 
   C5 mimetic art with opinion 
 simple imitator D6   C6 dissembling imitator  
   popular orator  D7     C7 sophist 
   art produced by instruments D4 
 mimetic art with knowledgeD5 
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10.5. Concluding note for Setions 9 and 10.  
 
We have argued that each of the two examples of Division and Collection contained 
in the Sophistes, that of the Angler and of the Sophist, has the structure of a 
philosophic analogue of periodic anthyphairesis. 
Although the arguments leading to this interpretation are strong, one might remark 
that there is no indication to be found anywhere in the Sophistes that the Division is 
anything but finite. On the contrary, the language employed suggests that the Division 
ends when we arrive at an indivisible species. The language appears to contradict our 
claim about infinity and periodicity of the Platonic Division. Nevertheless we shall 
see in the Politicus Plato definitely describes the Division and Collection as periodic 
(Section 11c). However the question on indivisibility needs be explained. This will be 
done in Section 14. 
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11. The Division and Collection of the Platonic Idea ‘the Statesman’ 
in the Politicus 
 
The third and final dialogue in the trilogy on Plato’s theory of knowledge is the 
Politicus. We will outline the contents of this dialogue, proceeding, not in the order 
presented by Plato but, in logical order. 
The art of statesmanship is defined by the method ‘name and logos’, equivalently 
‘division and collection’, involving steps with binary division and the logos criterion, 
in agreement with the method employed in the Sophistes.  
We have seen in Sections 9 and 10 that in the Sophistes a Platonic Idea, like the 
Angler or the Sophist, becomes known to us humans by the definition of an Art, the 
Art of Angling or the Art of Sophistry, respectively, employing the method of 
division and collection, equivalently of ‘name and logos’, which we interpreted as a 
philosophic analogue of periodic anthyphairesis. It follows, from 11a below, that the 
Idea Statesman in the Politicus becomes known to us by the definition of the art of 
Statesmanship, employing the method of division and collection, equivalently of 
‘name and logos’, a method already interpreted as the philosophic analogue of the 
eventually periodic anthyphairesis.  
 
11.1. The first ten steps of the Division and Collection (258b-267c) 
 
The aim of the Politicus is to obtain the knowledge (episteme) of the Platonic Idea of 
the Statesman, by the method of Division and Collection, the method employed in the 
Sophistes. In the first part of the dialogue, 258b-267c, the first ten steps of the 
Division are obtained. The initial genus G of all arts is successively divided in the 
binary manner familiar from the Sophistes. Thus 
 
G divided into (K1, L1),  
L1 divided into (K2, L2), 
…,  
 
L9 divided into (K10, L10).  
 
Here is the Figure summarising these ten initial steps of the Division. 
 
 
 [G] all arts  
(258b-259d) 
[K1] practical [L1] scientific 
(‘gnostike’) 
 
[L1] scientific  
(259d-260c) 
[K2]appraise, 
determine, 
(‘krinein’) 
[L2] command, 
 
 
 
[L2] command  
 34 
(260c-261b) 
[K3] someone 
else’s  
commands 
[L3] one’s own 
commands 
 
 
[L3] one’s own commands  
(261b-d) 
[K4] lifeless herd  [L4] herd of living 
beings (=animals) 
 
 
[L4] herd of animals  
(261d-e) 
[K5] herd of  
a single animal 
(‘monotrophia’) 
[L5] herd of 
 many animals 
 
 
[L5] herd of many animals  
(264b-d) 
[K6] herd of 
aquatic animals 
[L6]herd of  
land animals 
 
 
[L6] herd of many land animals  
(264e-265b) 
[K7] herd of  
flying animals 
[L7] herd of 
walking animals 
 
 
[L7] herd of many walking land animals 
(265b-d)  
[K8] herd of 
horned animals 
[L8] herd of 
hornless animals 
 
 
[L8] herd of many hornless walking land 
animals  
(265d-e) 
[K9] herd of 
mixing animals 
[L9] herd of 
non-mixing 
animals 
 
 
[L9] herd of many non-mixing hornless 
walking land animals  
(265e-266d) 
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[K10] herd of  
four-footed  
(diameter’s diameter)  
pigs 
[L10] herd of  
two-footed 
(diameter) 
 (human) 
 
 
Note that after L4 we are dealing with  
the arts of feeding an animal herd (‘agelaiotrophike’, 261b-d);  
what is really being divided is the nature of the herd, narrowing it down, by 
successive binary division and exclusion, till we get to  
the arts of commanding a human herd (L10, 265e-266d). 
 
11.2. The argument for the need to continue the Division (267c-268d and 274e-
277c)  
 
The division steps described in 11a is not the end of our quest for the definition of the 
Statesman, as one might think. This is so because L10 consists of  
the arts of commanding a human herd  
but we are interested to define  
the statesmanship,  
which is  
the optimal art of commanding a human herd. 
This means that there is still ahead of us a second process of successive binary 
divisions, in which the herd is fixed as a human herd, and what is being now narrowed 
down, by binary division and exclusion, is  
the nature of commanding this human herd (‘agelaiokomike’, 275e),  
till we get to  
the optimal commanding. 
 
11.3. The myth of palindromic periodicity with Kronos era and Zeus era (268d-
274e) 
 
According to this myth 268d-274e, there are two eras in the world, the Kronos era and 
the Zeus era. 
The world, to be thought of as spherical entity, rotates in a certain direction during the 
Kronos era. After a long time, when all the possible stages of the Kronos era are 
exhausted (‘to geinon hede pan aneloto genos’ ‘pasas tas geneseis apodedokuias’), it 
is necessary to reverse the direction (‘palin anestrephen’) and to go from the Kronos 
era to the Zeus era (272d6-e6).28
When the Zeus era is in danger of losing its direction and God perceives that it is in 
trouble, and that ‘it might founder in the tempest of confusion and sink in the infinite 
sea of dissimilarity (‘kedomenos hina me heimastheis hupo taraches dialetheis eis ton 
tes anomoiotetos apeiron onta ponton’), he … reversed (‘strepsas’) whatever had 
become unsound and unsettled in the previous period when the world was left to 
itself, set the world in order, restored it and made it immortal (‘athanaton’) and 
  
                                                 
28 In a reconstruction of the proof of the theorem that every Theaetetean mixture has a palindromically 
periodic anthyphairesis, given in Section 13, there is a pigeonhole argument exactly at thye end of the 
semiperiod, namely in Plato;s terminology at the point of change from the Kronos era to the Zeus era. 
The reason given above for the change (aneloto, apodedokuias) appears to fit well with the pigeonhole 
argument. 
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ageless (‘ageron’)’, thus returning  (273c4-e4). In this way, we are back again to the 
Kronos period and completing a full period.29
The world moves forever repeating this period, alternating the Kronos era with the 
Zeus era. 
  
The relation of the two eras is especially interesting. It is chematically described as 
follows: In the Zeus era (in which era we are presently) men come from non-existence 
a into existence b, then they grow c, then they get a beard d, then their beard becomes 
white e, then they grow old and are about to die f. If at this time the world happens to 
switch to the Kronos era, then the human will go from stage f to e then to d then to c 
then to b and then they pass into nonexistence a (270d-271a). 
Summarising, according to the myth, the world is periodic, and the period consists of 
two half periods, the Kronos era followed by the Zeus era, in other words it is 
palindromically periodic.. 
 
11.4. Every Division and Collection has palindromically periodic form, and is 
thus an infinite division. In particular the first ten steps of the Division and 
Collection of the Statesman correspond to the Kronos era and must be completed 
with the divisions of the Zeus era, in palindromic to the Kronos era manner, to 
be followed by the embracement of both in the Collection by means of Logos 
(276a) 
 
The passage 276a1-7 is crucial for our interpretation of the Politicus, because in this 
passage Plato makes perfectly clear that the palindromic periodicity of the myth must 
be applied for the Division and Collection of the Statesman, and since the Statesman 
is merely an example of an Art, and its Division and Collection is meant to show the 
general method, it certainly follows that  
every Division and Collection (including that of the Angler [Section 9], that of the 
Sophisth [Section 10], and that of the Statesman, presently under construction) has a 
(palindromically) periodic form.  
This is the place to be reminded of that all descriptions of the method of (Division 
and) Collection in the Platonic dialogues exhbit the cyclical, periodic nature of the 
method.  
  
In particular, the Platonic Division and Collection is not like the Aristotelian division 
into a genus and differentia, clearly a strictly finite division, but, having a periodic 
form, is an infinite division. The passage 276a1-7 is the following: 
     
 [ΝΕ. ΣΩ.]... ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦτο διαίρεσις  
αὖ τίνα τρόπον ἐγίγνετ' ἄν;      
ΞΕ. Κατὰ ταὐτὰ  
καθ' ἅπερ ἔμπροσθεν  
διῃρούμεθα  
τὴν ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν 
πεζοῖς τε  
καὶ ἀπτῆσι,  
καὶ ἀμείκτοις τε  
καὶ  ἀκεράτοις, 
                                                 
29 Continuing the previous footnote the reason given by Plato for the change from the Zeus era to the 
Kronos era is the need to avoid the bad, non periodic infinite, something achieved by the Logos 
criterion. Again Plato’s philosophic account fits well with the mathematical proof. 
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τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἄν που  
τούτοις  
διαιρούμενοι  
καὶ τὴν ἀγελαιοκομικὴν  
τήν τε νῦν  
καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλείαν  
περιειληφότες ἂν ἦμεν ὁμοίως  
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.  
Translated as follows: 
 Younger Socrates: 
…but how would  
the next division be made? 
Stranger: 
In the same kinds (‘kata tauta’) 
as (‘kathaper’) 
we divided 
the art of feeding herds 
before 
in 
 
 those  
that go on foot [L7] 
 
and the winged, 
[K7] 
  
 and 
the unmixed breeds 
[L9] 
 
 and the hornless, 
[L8] 
 
 we must divide 
the art of tending herds 
in arts similar to 
(‘tois autois’)  
those (‘toutois’),  
embracing (‘perieilephotes’) in the logos (‘en toi logoi’) 
both 
 the present [Zeus] era 
and the Kronos era.  
 
 
 The second half of the process 
(agelaiokomike, 
where the commanded herd is the human 
herd, held fixed, and  
the nature of the commanding herdsman  
is the variable) 
corresponds to 
the Zeus era, 
while the first half 
(agelaiotrophike, 
 
 38 
where the nature of the commanded herd  
is the variable) 
corresponds to 
the Kronos era, 
in the aneilixis myth (11.3). 
Thus (276a) is precisely the point in the Politicus, where the method of division and 
collection, namely the method of philosophic periodic anthyphairesis, 
is explicitly connected to palindromicity, since 
the Kronos  
 and the Zeus 
eras  are in palindromic relation in the myth of world ‘aneilixis’. 
In this passage 
the first half of the process, 
with first ten division steps  
G divided into K1, L1,  
L1 divided into K2, L2, 
…, 
L9 divided into K10, L10, 
is associated explicitly  with 
the Kronos era, 
 
 and, also explicitly, it is stated that  
the definition of the statesman  
must be completed,  
as in the myth of aneilixis,  
with its second half,  
with last division steps, say  
W11 divided into Z10, W10, 
W10 divided into Z9, W9, 
…, 
W2 divided into Z1, W1, 
corresponding to 
the Zeus era,  
palindromic to 
the Kronos era,  
the whole comprising  a full period, cycle. 
   
(There are also the many steps L11, L12,...,W12, W11 which are not examined in 
detail, but are given in groups, in the form of ‘contingent causes’ (287b-289a). We 
will not be concerned with this part of the definition of the statesman, which probably 
has too some palindromic characteristics (indicated in the scheme below), as it is of 
no importance for our reconstruction). 
 
In accordance with the Divisions and Collections of the Sophistes, this cycle must be 
realised by the Logos criterion.This takes the following form: The last genus of the 
Zeus era, denoted W1, will be divided into the art of the strategy K’1 and of the 
statesmanship  L’1, hence the logos criterion holds K’1/L’1=K1/L1 
 
Thus the new element in the Politicus Division and Collection, introduced by 11.3 
and 11.4, in relation to the Sophistes, is not only periodicity, as in the Sophistes, but in 
addition the presence of palindromicity within the period; in other words we expect 
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that the anthyphairesis will have a period, but one presenting a certain symmetry with 
respect to the middle of the period. In the language suggested by the myth 11.3, the 
division steps within the period will be divided into two parts, the first half to be the 
Kronos era, and the second half the Zeus era (cf. 276a discussed in (iii) and (iv) in 
11e, below).  
 
We then expect that the definition of the Statesman must exhibit the palindromicity of 
these two eras.We will now show that this is precisely the plan suggested and realised 
by Plato for defining the Statesman. 
 
11.5. The last ten division steps  (267c-268d and 274e-277c, 289e-305e) 
 
 The last ten steps Z10,…, Z1 in the Zeus era and the Logos Criterion in the definition 
of the Statesman, are described in 289e-305e.  
 
(i) The game (277e).  
 
Plato has no intention to give the Zeus steps explicitly and in succession, so these 
steps are not given in their correct order, in which they appear in the definition of the 
statesman, but in the form of a game, reminding of a grammatical children’s game, as 
explicitly stated in 277e. To find the right order and the logos criterion and thus 
complete the definition of the statesman is going to be our task.  
 
(ii) The rules of the game.  
 
However Plato sets precise rules which enable us to complete this definition. 
 
Rule 1. One to One palindromic correspondence between Kj and Zj (276a, 277e-
279a). 
 
To every division step (Kj, Lj) of the Kronos era, namely of agelaiokomike, where 
some type of herd Kj, governed and led, is rejected, there is a unique division step 
(Zj, Wj) of the Zeus era, namely of agelaiotrophike, where some ‘similar’ type of 
governing and leadership Zj of the human herd is rejected, for j=1,..,10. The ‘positive’ 
genera Wj are not given (but the method of DC implies that in principle they are 
uniquely defined, as relative complement of Zj in Wj+1). 
 
Rule 2. Order of government systems (291c-303b). 
 
There are six types of conventional government, namely  
government (I) by one, or by few, or by many, and  
government (II) with laws, or without laws,  
in every possible combination in each of the two criteria (I) and (II).  
Thus  
T Tyranny is government by one, without laws,  
O Oligarchy by few without laws,  
An Anarchy by many without laws,  
D Democracy by many with laws,  
Ar Aristocracy, by few with laws, and  
M Monarchy by one with laws. 
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(Plato does not use the term Anarchy for the government by many without laws in the 
Politicus, but he does use the term elsewhere, e.g. in the Laws 942a-d).  
 
There is a quite long discussion on these types of government in the Politicus 291c-
303b with the following conclusions:  
(2a)There is an ordering of these six types of government as follows: 
T>O>An>D>Ar>M  
in the sense that T is the worst and M the relatively best form of government. This 
ordering is so, because  
(i) in the absence of government by knowledge, it is better to have laws, than to be 
governed without laws, and  
(ii) without laws the many govern better than the few and they better than the one, 
while in the presence of laws the situation is precisely the reverse. 
(2b) All these conventional types of government are to be rejected, because they are 
not based on true knowledge. Hence each of them (possibly more than one at a time) 
will be rejected at some Zj. 
(2c) All types of government with laws are to be rejected because laws, and in fact 
everything written, is lifeless, as opposed to true knowledge, which has life and soul. 
This is strongly supported by Plato’s similar rejection, in the final part of the 
Phaedrus 274c5-277a5, of the written word, in general, as an image and as not truly 
alive. 
 
Rule 3. Order of rejection (303d-e). 
 
Of all types of government that are to be rejected, a relatively better type of 
government x, rejected at stage Zj of the Zeus era, will not be rejected before a 
relatively worse type of government y, rejected at stage Zi of the Zeus era. Thus if 
y>x, in the sense that y is a relatively worse and x is a relatively better type of 
government, then i is greater than or equal to j. 
 
Rule 4. The last three arts to be rejected (303e-305e)  
 
The arts of Judgeship, Rhetoric and Strategy are the relatively highest arts, and are 
thus the last three to be rejected.  
 
(iii) Finding the palindromic correspondences  
 
We now apply these Rules, set by Plato for the purpose, in order to determine the 
second half of the division for the statesman 
 
[Z4] It is clear by Rules 1 and 2c, considering that  
in K4 lifeless herds are rejected,  
that  
in Z4 government by law (including Democracy D, Aristocracy Ar, Monarchy M) 
must be rejected. 
 
[Z3, Z6, Z7] It is fairly clear by Rule 1 that  
in Z7 the heralds (whose patron god Hermes, the herald of the Gods, is flying) (290a-
c),  
in Z6 the merchants and shipmasters(289e-290a), and  
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in Z3 the priests and diviners (290c-291a), are to be rejected as governors. 
 
[Z10] Some argument is needed to convince us that the rejection of the sophists as 
governors in 291b-c, and again in 303b-c (of the sophists’ sophists, this second time 
to be exact), is palindromically related to the rejection of the pigs as herd in K10 
(265e-266c). Here Plato is multiply playful: in the first place the distinction of the pig 
from human is that it is four-footed; this is playfully described, in geometric language, 
as ‘diameter’s diameter’. We observe that the queer expression ‘diameter’s 
diameter’ has some similarity of form with the equally queer expression ‘sophists’ 
sophists’; but we would be rather at a loss to find any more significant association; 
unless we note that while a true dialectician is preoccupied with ‘the diameter itself’ 
(Politeia 510d5-511a1), a partless Being, it is the sophists who, according to Meno 
85b4,  call ‘diameter’ the straight line that joins one edge of a square with its 
opposite edge, a divisible magnitude. The meaning of this distinction is possibly the 
following: sophists occupy themselves with magnitudes and in general with sensibles, 
while the dialectician occupies himself with the idea of the diameter, something that is 
rather the logos of the diameter to the side of a square. In any case the Meno suggests 
that there is a connection between the diameter and the sophists; hence there is also 
indeed a connection between ‘diameter’s diameter’ the four footed pig and sophists 
sophist, hinting, of course that the worst sophists are like pigs. We are clearly ready, 
granted a certain playfulness, to accept that, by Rule1, step K10, where the herd of 
pigs is rejected, is palindromically related with step Z10, where the sophists are 
rejected as governors.  
 
[Z8, Z9] It now follows necessarily, by the rules 2 and 3, that the three types of 
conventional government without laws T>O>An must be associated with the three 
remaining free positions in the Zeus era, namely Z9, Z8, Z5, respectively. Namely, 
Tyranny must be rejected at Z9 (while K9 rejects herds of animals accepting mixed 
breed),  
Oligarchy at Z8 (while K8 rejects herds of horned animals), and  
Anarchy at Z5 (while K5 rejects herds consisting of a single animal).  
It remains to see however if these necessary associations do result in palindromicity, 
something necessary if our interpretation is to work. For the first two of these 
associations, (K9, Z9) and (K8, Z8), the palindromicity follows from Plato’s likening 
twice the two worse classes of conventional politicians with Centaurs and Satyrs 
(291a-b, 303c-d); thus  
in Z9 the Centaurs are to be rejected, representing in Plato’s terminology the tyrants, 
in perfect palindromicity with K9, and  
in Z8 the Satyrs are to be rejected, representing in Plato’s terminology the oligarchs, 
in perfect palindromicity with K8.  
 
[Z5] For the last of these associations, (K5, Z5), it is not immediately obvious from 
the Politicus why this should be so, namely why Anarchy should be palindromic to 
the rejected herd in K4, and thus be placed in the position of the rejected part in Z4. 
However this is well explained by the comparison of the description of Anarchy in the 
Laws 942a5-d2, as ‘kata monas dran’, i.e. as a government where each person acts 
singly, with the description of the rejected herd in K4, as ‘monotrophia’, i.e. a herd 
consisting of a single animal Thus Anarchy (=Democracy without laws) fits well with 
the rejected part of Z4. 
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[Z2] We are left with the arts of Judging, Rhetoric and Strategy, for which Plato sets 
Rule 4, that they will be rejected last (303e-305e). Of them Judging is related to 
‘krinein’ (305b-c), and thus Z2 is associated, by Rule 1, with Judges (by 
palindromicity), because K2 rejects ‘krinein’, and Z2 is set to reject Judges as 
governors and Z2 to Judges (‘krinein’ is the crucial word, Z2 (305b?), and K2 (260a-
c). 
 
[Z1] The art of Rhetoric is the next art rejected, as it is a practical science (304c-e), 
and thus Z1 is associated, by Rules 1 and 4, with Rhetoric, since K1 rejects practical 
sciences, and Z1 is set to reject Rhetoric.  
 
This completes the quest for the palindromic correspondences between the first ten 
steps of the Kronos era with the last ten steps of the Zeus era.  
 
(iv) Summary of the Palindromic correspondence between the first ten steps of 
the Kronos era with the last ten steps of the Zeus era.  
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K10] in the Kronos era,  namely the art of 
governing a hornless, not mixing, four-footed (likened to diameter’s diameter) 
animal herd, namely pigs, is palindromically related to 
 the rejected part of the binary division  [Z10] in the Zeus era, namely the art of 
governing by sophists (whose practitioners are likened to sophist’s sophists).  
To see this relation note that ‘diameter’ as a divisible magnitude, is opposed to 
‘diameter itself’ (cf. Politeia 510d5-511a1, a partless Being), and is related to the 
sophists (as in Meno 85b4). 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K9] in the Kronos era, namely the art 
commanding herds of mixing with other breeds, is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z9] in the Zeus era, namely the art of 
governing according to tyranny without laws, governors likened to ‘centaurs’, 
acting and governing as animals mixing with other breeds. 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K8] in the Kronos era,  namely the art of 
commanding a herd of horned animals, is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z8] in the Zeus era, namely the art of 
governing according to oligarchy without laws, governors likened to ‘satyrs’, 
acting and governing as horned animals. 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K7] in the Kronos era, namely the art of 
commanding a herd of flying animals,  is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z7] in the Zeus era, namely the art of  
heraldry, namely of governing and acting according to their protector Hermes, so 
to speak, in a flying manner. 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K6] in the Kronos era, namely the art of 
commanding an aquatic herd,  is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z6] in the Zeus era, namely the art of  being a 
merchant, namely of governing and acting, so to speak, in a aquatic manner. 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K5] in the Kronos era, namely the art of 
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commanding a single animal herd (‘monotrophia’), is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z5] in the Zeus era, namely the art of 
governing according to democracy without laws, namely with anarchy, described in 
the Laws 942a-d as governing as a single person (‘kata monas dran’). 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K4] in the Kronos era, namely the art of 
giving one’s own commands over a lifeless herd, is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z4] in the Zeus era, namely the art of 
governing with written laws (namely acting himself in a  lifeless manner, according 
to Phaidrus 274c5-277a5). 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K3] in the Kronos era, namely the art of 
giving someone else’s commands, is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z3] in the Zeus era, namely the art of 
priesthood (dedicated to giving someone else’s commands). 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K2] in the Kronos era, namely the art of 
determining, appraising (krinein), is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z2] in the Zeus era, namely the art of judging 
(which is an art of determining, appraising (krinein), as is in fact explained in the 
Politicus 305b). 
 
-the rejected part of the binary division [K1] in the Kronos era, namely the practical 
arts, is palindromically related to  
the rejected part of the binary division  [Z1] in the Zeus era, namely the practical art 
of the Rhetoric (or more precicely the part of Rhetoric dissociated from sophistry, cf. 
304a) (304c-e). 
 
(v) Logos in the Division and Collection of the art of statesmanship  
 
The very last division is the division of W1 into the practical art of the strategy K’1 
and the gnostical art of the statesman L’1 (304e-305a).  
The Logos criterion consists in equating  
the initial logos: practical arts K1/ scientific arts L1 
with  
the final logos: practical art strategy K’1/scientific art of statesmanship L’1. 
 
11.6. The definition of the Statesman as a philosophic palindromically periodic  
anthyphairesis (Politicus 258c-267c, 289e-305e) 
 
We are now ready to collect all the pieces of the Division and Collection of the 
Statesman.The following figure incorporates most of the information needed for the 
definition of the Statesman as a philosophic palindromically periodic anthyphairesis 
in the Politicus. 
 
 
Kronos era, 
‘agelaiotrophike’ 
Zeus era, 
‘agelaiokomike’ 
 
[G] all arts  
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(258b-259d) 
[K1] practical [L1] scientific 
(gnostike) 
[W1] [Z1] rhetoric 
(304c-e), 
  [W2] 
 
[W1]   
[K’1] strategy 
<practical>  
(304e-305a) 
[L’1] statesman 
<scientific 
(gignoskousa)> 
  
Logos Criterion 
K’1/L’1=K1/L1 
 periodicity and complete knowledge 
of the Statesman 
  
 
[L1] scientific  
(259d-260c) 
  
[K2] 
appraise, determine 
‘krinein’ 
[L2] command 
 
 
[W2] [Z2] judgeship  
(leaders acting on 
an appraising 
‘krinein’ manner) 
(305b-c) 
  [W3] (304e-305c) 
 
[L2] command  
(260c-261b) 
 
[K3] someone 
else’s  
commands 
[L3] one’s own 
commands 
[W3] [Z3] priests  
leaders acting on 
someone else’s 
commands) 
 [W4] (290c-291a) 
 
[L3] one’s own commands  
(261b-d) 
 
[K4] lifeless herd  [L4] on living 
beings 
(=animals) 
[W4] [Z4] with written 
laws, 
lifeless 
leaders acting in 
lifeless manner 
 [W5] (291d-303b) 
 
[L4] (261d-e) 
on animals 
 
[K5]   
a single animal 
(‘monotrophia’) 
[L5] herd of  
many animals 
[W5] [Z5] Democracy  
without laws, 
anarchy 
(‘kata monas dran’)  
Leaders acting as 
single 
 [ZW6] (291d-303b) 
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[L5] (264b-d) 
on many animals 
 
[K6] herd of 
aquatic animals 
[L6] which are  
land animals 
[W6] [Z6] merchants 
(on ships) 
Leaders acting in 
aquatic manner 
 [W7] (289e-290a) 
 
[L6] (264e-265b) 
On many land animals  
 
[K7] herd of  
flying animals 
[L7] which are  
walking 
[W7] [Z7] heralds 
(flying Hermes) 
Leaders acting in 
flying manner 
 [W8] (290a-c) 
 
[L7] (265b-d) 
On many walking land animals  
 
[K8] herd of 
horned animals 
[L8] which are 
hornless 
[W8] [Z8] satyrs- 
 (oligarchy-  
few, 
without laws) 
leaders acting as 
horned animals 
 [W9] (291b, 303b-d) 
 
[L8] (265d-e) 
On many hornless walking land animals  
 
[K9] herd of 
mixing animals 
[L9] which are 
non-mixing 
[W9] [Z9] centaurs- 
tyrants 
(one,  
without laws) 
leaders acting as 
mixing animals 
 [W10] (291a, 303b-d) 
 
[L9] (265e-266d) 
On many non-mixing hornless walking 
land animals  
 
[K10] diameter’s 
diameter  
herd of  
four-footed pigs 
[L10] which are  
two-footed 
(human) 
diameter 
[W10] [Z10] sophist’s 
sophist 
leaders acting as 
pigs 
 [W11] (291b-c, 303b-d) 
 
 [L10>L11>…>W11] (287b-289a) 
contingent causes 
 
 primary nourishment  
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 instrument play  
 receptacle defence  
 vehicle  
 
The figure is to be read as follows: 
 
start the division with the left column,  
read from up G downwards to L10,  
consisting of the ten first binary division steps of the Kronos era 
the initial genus G is divided into K1 and L1,  
L1 is divided into K2 and L2, 
..., 
L9 is divided into K10 and L10; 
 
continue with the contingent causes  
L10 to L11 to …to W11,  
Collective steps in the division steps; 
 
complete the division with the right column, 
read from below W11 upwards to W1, 
consisting of the ten last binary division steps of the Zeus era 
W11 is divided into Z10 and W10,  
W10 is divided into Z9 and W9, 
..., 
W2 is divided into Z1 and W1, and 
W1  is divided into K’1 and L’1;  
 
end with the Logos criterion K1/L1=K’1/L’1, 
resulting in periodicity and complete knowledge of the Statesman. 
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12. Τhe double Measurement in the Politicus 283a-287b is  
--the philosophic imitation of the Theaetetean mixture  
--the cause of Division and Collection, and 
--the Philebean Idea as mixture of infinite and finite 
 
 
12.1. The double measurement in the Politicus 283a-287b is the philosophic 
analogue, the imitation of ‘commensurability in power only’ 
 
We consider opposite entities, of the type numbers, magnitudes (lines, areas, 
volumes), qualities (velocities) x, y. 
 
There is a double ‘measurement’:  
(a) x against y, and  
(b) x against ‘the mean(x, y)’ (Greek term: ‘mesos’) (284e). 
 
Condition on measurement (a): not all opposite pairs x, y should be measured in this 
way; in fact if x measured against y produces a ‘pleasure’ (Greek term: ‘hedone’), 
then this pair  must be excluded (286d). 
 
Condition on measurement(b): if x, y is a pair, such that if x is measured against y 
then pleasure is not the product, then the second measurement, x against the mean(x, 
y), is a ‘generation’ (Greek term: ‘genesis’) (283d, 284b-c, d-e).  
 
We will now decipher these terms and conditions: 
 
[measurement of opposites] Measurement is about length and shortness, or excess 
and deficiency, or greatness and smallness, or the greater and the less, or the great and 
the small (283c-e), collectively of a magnitude or number or quality against its 
opposite (284e).  
 
[mean] We interpret ‘the mean(x, y)’ as the philosophic analogue of the geometric 
mean of two numbers or magnitudes. It is remarkable that in the Elements there are 
738 occurences of the term ‘meson’ (and its variants), and these exclusively and 
without exception refer to the ‘geometric mean’ (of two numbers or of two 
magnitudes), while NONE of them refers to the arithmetic or any other mean, or any 
other sense; of them, the great majority 624, occur in the Theaetetean Book X.30
 
. The 
alternative term used ‘metrios’ (283e, 284a, c, d, e) has normally a meaning 
equivalent to ‘mesos’. 
[pleasure] That ‘the dyad x, y produces pleasure’ is equivalent, as explicitly stated in 
the Platonic dialogue on pleasures Philebus 27e, 31a, 41d,  with ‘the dyad x, y is an 
Infinite’, which according to our interpretation described in Section 3a above, is 
equivalent with ‘ the dyad x, y produces an infinite’. Thus the condition on the 
measurement (a) is that the pair x, y does not produce an infinite, hence a finite. Thus 
the measurement of x against y is a (Philebean) finite. 
 
                                                 
30 I owe this remark to Aliki Bassiakou [Ba]. 
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[generation] In Plato there is ‘generation only’, as in the Phaedo 70b-72e, the 
Theaetetus 156a-157b, the Sophistes 247d-248a, or the Timaeus 27d5-29d3, 57d7-
58c4, and ‘generation in substance’, as in the Philebus 27c, or the Parmenides 142c-
143a or the Politicus 283d, 284c, d (cf. interesting comment by Proclus in Platonic 
Theology 3,91,9-24: the frequent use of words related to generation, such as 
‘gignesthai’ (142d5), ‘gignetai’ (142e4), ‘genetai’ (142e6), ‘gignomenon’ (143a1), 
refers to ‘the progress of the intelligible multitude’ (‘peri tes proodou tou noetou 
plethous’). Thus ‘genesis’ and ‘generation’ does not refer only to the sensibles, but 
also to the intelligibles.31
the condition on the measurement (b) is that the pair x, mean(x, y) produces a 
(Philebean) infinite.  
 That ‘the dyad x, z is a generation’ implies that ‘the dyad x, 
z generates an infinite multitude of parts’, either as an indefinite dyad only or within a 
Being, namely that ‘the dyad x, z is either an Infinite or a mixture of Infinite and 
Finite’, hence, according to our interpretation given in Section 3, that ‘the dyad x, z 
produces an infinite anthyphairesis’. Thus  
 
[The double measurement in the Politicus 283a-287b is the philosophic analogue 
of a dyad of lines  incommensurable in lengh only]   
Finally in order to state the two measurement conditions (a) and (b) in the more 
familiar terms employed by Book X. of the Elements,  
we choose an assumed  ‘unit’ line r (as with the ‘protetheisa line’ in Book X, 
definition 3, and the one foot line in the Theaetetus 147-8), and,  
employing Proposition II.14 of the Elements, we construct lines a, b, such that  
x r=a2, y r=b2
so that  
 ,  
mean(x, y)=a b;  
The ratio x/y=the ratio xr/yr=a2/b
hence (using the Topics definition, mentioned in Section 6a above), 
2 
the ratio x/ mean(x, y)=the ratio xr/m(x,y) r= the ratio a2
 
/ a b= the ratio a/b. 
We are now in a position to claim that  
the double measurement described is revealed to be the philosophic analogue of the 
mathematical condition ‘commensurability in power only’,  
since 
Condition (a) is equivalent to the commensurability of a2, b2
Condition (b) is equivalent to the incommensurability of a, b,  
, and 
so that in conjunction they are equivalent to  
the condition of commesurability in power only,  
the Theaetetean mixture.   
 
 
12.2. The double measurement as the cause of all Division and Collection, 
Politicus 283a-287b 
 
We stay in the same passage of the Politicus. Plato next makes an important statement 
about the fundamental significance of the condition of the double measurement we 
have just deciphered:  
                                                 
31 It is precisely the lack of realisation, by Cherniss and others, that there is intelligible ‘genesis’ as 
well, that has led them to mistakenly conclude that the mixtures of Infinite and Finite in the Philebus 
are not true Beings and Ideas. 
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(a) All arts without exception, including the statesmanship and the art of weaving 
(283e-284e),  
(b) the method of division and collection (284e-285c), equivalently described as 
‘division according to kinds’ (286d-287a), or as ‘name and logos’, sometimes 
shortened to ‘logos’ (285c-286b), by which as we saw in the Sophistes Platonic 
Beings become known to us, and  
(c) the new property of ‘aneilixis’ (286b) , which is explained in the Politicus for the 
first time in the trilogy on knowledge,  
are all caused by a double measurement as described in (12.1).  
Art is a term loosely used in the Sophistes as well, and is never really defined 
formally by Plato. But we can attempt with safety to interpret this term, on the basis 
of its quite often use by Plato, as follows: 
 
[art] A Form is knowable to humans as an Art. This is why although the Sophist is a 
Platonic Being, and the Statesman an Idea and a Form, nevertheless each becomes 
known to us in the ontological status of an Art, an inferior entity, in that divisions are 
more spread out and Unity is less pronounced than in the Form itself. 
The term ‘aneilixis’ occurs in the Politicus only twice, in 270d and in 286b. The 
second occurrence (286b) has the purpose to tell us that the phenomenon of ‘aneilixis’ 
is caused in all arts by the fundamental condition of the double measurement. The 
first occurrence (270d) cannot have any other purpose but to DEFINE, to explain 
what is meant by ‘aneilixis’.   
 
12.3. The mixture of the Infinite and the Finite that constitutes a Platonic Idea in 
the Philebus 16c is the philosophic analogue of the Theaetetean mixture of 
incommensurability and commensurability; and,  
according to the Theaetetus 147d-148d Theaetetus and younger Socrates had a 
proof of the Proposition: every Theaetetean mixture of incommensurability and 
commensurability has a palindromically periodic anthyphairesis.  
 
The two Divisions and Collections of the Sophistes were interpreted, in Sections 9 and 
10, as the philosophic analogues of periodic anthyphairesis.  
The Division and Collection of the Statesman in the Politicus was interpreted, in 
Section 11, as the philosophic analogue of palindromically periodic anthyphairesis. 
The cause of every Division and Collection is declared, in the Politicus, to be the 
Double measurement (Section 12.2), and the Double measurement was interpreted 
(Section 12.1) as the philosophic analogue of the Theaetetean mixture, namely of the 
dyad of lines incommensurable in length only. 
Thus a remarkable consequence of our interpretation (Sections 9, 10, 11 and 12) is 
that the total content of the Platonic dialogue Politicus is the following statement: 
 
‘Every art, namely every Platonic Idea in form accessible to humans, in particular the 
art of the statesmanship and the art of the sophistry, possesses a a dyad of elements x, 
y, such that the measurement of x against y forms a philosophic finite (not a pleasure), 
while the measurement of x against the (geometric) mean m(x, y), forms a 
philosophic infinite (the generation of the mean), and precisely for this reason every 
art is knowable by the method of Division and Collection, which is the philosophic 
analogue of a palindromically periodic antrhphairesis.’ 
 
Now this philosophic statement completes the imitation ‘peiro mimoumenos’ that 
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Socrates was exhorting Theaetetus to attempt, in the Theaetetus 147d-148d passage of 
the Division and Collection successfully established by Theaetetus .on a Theteatean 
mixture, as discussed in Setion 8.  
But now we cannot fail to take note that, in fact, what   has been perfectly and most 
closely imitated by Plato in the two dialogues Sophistes and Politicus is the modern 
theorem, described in Section 7, according to which ‘Every Theaetetean mixture has a 
palindromically periodic anthyphairesis’.  
 
The conclusions now are the following: 
--Theaetetus mathematical result described in the Theaetetus 147d-148d passage as 
Division and Collection of a power (or somewhat more generally, of a Theaetetean 
mixture) is precisely the modern Thyeorem (answering the question posed in Section 
5.32
--A Platonic Idea, is the philosophic analogue of a Theaetetean mixture, namely of a 
(slight generalisation of) a power, and the ‘episteme’ of a Platonic Idea, obtained by 
the method of Division and Collectrion, is precisely the philosophic analogue of 
palindromically periodic anthyphairesis. 
  
--Thus the Philebean mixture of infinite and finite is the philosophic analogue of a 
Theaetetean mixture. 
The last two statements answer trhe questions posed in Sections 2 and 3. 
 
12.4. Note comparing the Philebean Finite with the Pythagorean Finite. It should 
be pointed out that according to the Pythagoreans, too, the two principles of Beings is 
the Infinite and the Finite (cf. Philolaus, Fragments 1, 2, 6, and Aristotle, Metaphysics 
987a13-28). But, while the Infinite, in both Plato and the Pythagoreans, is 
anthyphairetic in content, the Finite for the Pythagoreans is the Gnomon. The evolved 
corresponding Platonic concept is Logos, as may also be seen from a comparison of 
(the possibly non-genuine) Fragment 11 by Philolaus (knowledge is achieved by 
Gnomon) with the passage 546b-c of the Politeia on geometric number (where 
Gnomon is in effect replaced by Logos). But Plato in the Philebus, not content with 
such replacement, insists that the principle of Finite has anthyphairetic content as 
well. Plato is able to modify the original Pythagorean scheme only because he has 
now in his possession the Theaetetus palindromic periodicity theorem.  
  
 
12.5.  A note on existing interpretations of Collection and Division 
 
The interpretation of Division and Collection presented in this paper (Sections 9, 10, 
11,12) is original and runs against practically all existing interpretations.  
 
Heidegger in [He, 1992] discusses the Division and Collection of the Angler in p.181-
197, and briefly of the Sophist in . 420-422. 
                                                 
32 Thus the view, enunciated by Knorr [Kn, 1975] that the method used by Theodorus and Theaetetus 
for the incommensurability proofs is not anthyphairetic, and the view, enunciated by Cherniss [Ch, 
1951] and Burnyeat [Bu, 1978] that the Platonic  text does not reveal the method of their 
incommensurability proofs are both mistaken. The method of both is shown to be anthyphairetic. 
Anthyphairetic reconstructions for these incommensurability proofs, mathematically impeccable but 
with no erguments for their  historical accuracy, have been proposed by Zeuthen [Z, 1910], van der 
Waerden [vdW, 1950], Fowler [Fow, 1986], Kahane [Ka, 1985] (among others). 
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Heidegger believes that a Platonic division 
-- is of finite length, ending in an indivisible species, 
--is essentially the same as the Aristotelian definitions by division of genus and 
differentia,  
and that the ‘logos’ in a Platonic division is identified with division.  
 
Cornford ([Co, 1932]; [Co,1935]; [Co 1939]) thought that ‘division is a downward 
process in which indivisible species are defined by the division of a genus with 
specific differences. In contrasting this approach to the characterization of Forms with 
earlier Platonic approaches Cornford writes: ‘In a word, the Socratic method 
approaches the Form to be defined from below, the new method descends to it from 
above.’ ([Mor, 1973], p.168). Collection is just the inverse of Division: he believed 
we could obtain the initial Genus by summing all the pieces of a Division together. 
According to this interpretation a Platonic Being is a One in the sense that it is the 
sum of its parts. Cornford and Skemp [Sk, 1952] seems to have thought that this type of 
collection takes place only at the beginning of the divisions. Hackforth [Ha, 1945], however, 
recognizes that collections take place at various places ([Mor, 1973], p.167). 
 
Cherniss ([Ch, 1936]; [Ch, 1945]; [Ch, 1951]) assessing negatively the method of 
Division and Collection believed that  
‘the assumption of Platonic ideas is incompatible with the constitution of the species 
from genus and differentiae’;   
‘The Sophist and Politicus, which have come to be considered as handbooks of 
diaeresis, show that he meant it rather to be a heuristic method, an instrument to 
facilitate the search for a definite idea, the distinction of that idea from other ideas, 
and its implications and identification, and that he did not imagine it to be a 
description of the "construction" of the idea, its derivation, or its constituent 
elements.’; 
‘diaeresis appears to be only an aid to reminiscence of the ideas, .... a process the 
stages of which are important rather as a safeguard to insure the right direction of the 
search"" than as representative of necessary ingredients of the idea’ ([Ch, 1945], p. 
53-55). 
 
Ryle ([Ry, 1965]; [Ry, 1966]) has an extremely low opinion of the method of 
Division and Collection, of the Divisions in the Sophistes, and of the whole Politicus, 
a ‘weary dialogue’..He writes (in [Ry, 1966]): 
‘but until we ger to the Sophist we have nothing reminding us of the contribution of 
Linnaeus to botany; nor should we have been grateful or philosophically emlightened 
if we had’  (p. 136-7); 
‘the demonstrations of division in the Sophist and Politicus were intended for the 
tutorial benefit of beginners in the Academy’,  
‘while the Politicus seems to be designed for beginners only, the Sophist is a clumsily 
assembled sandwich of which the bread could be of educative value only to beginners 
and the meat could be of value only to highly sophisticated young dialecticians’.  
‘So Plato may have composed the Politicus for the special benefit of the 
philosophically innocent novices who were at that moment getting their freshman’s 
training in the ABC of thinking’ (p.285). 
 
According to a more recent assessment, by Fossheim [Fos, 2010] ‘However, Ryle’s 
judgement is all the same a difficult one to defend in face of the textual evidence. In 
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the Philebus (16c), division is heralded as a divine gift, as something handed over 
from gods to men. Furthermore, speaking more generally, collection and division 
holds a prominent position in the so-called late dialogues. In short, it seems to be 
taken very seriously, and is unflinchingly applied to matters that are both important 
and difficult.’  
We may add Plato’s extensive expressions of admiration on the method of Division 
and Collection in the Politicus as well; and what has been said about Ryle’s views on 
Division and Collection can also be said about the corresponding Cherniss’ view. 
 
Ackrill ([Ac, 1955]; [Ac, 1957]), in reply to Ryle, offers some sort of support of 
Plato’s Division and Collection. But at best Plato’s method for Ackrill is a primitive 
version of Aristotle’s divisions.  
He writes: ‘Aristotle does indeed have, as Plato does not, a rather closely worked-out 
account of strict genus-species kind-ladders. But he continually speaks of divisions and 
of kinds and sorts (‘genera’ and ‘species’) in contexts where nobody supposes that he is, 
or thinks he is, doing the work of a Linnaeus.’ (p.107) 
‘To Ackrill, its status as late Plato state-of-the-art method is corroborated 
by the continuity between division and the full-blown genus-species ladders 
developed by Aristotle.’ is Fossheim’s assessment [Fos, 2010]. 
 
Moravczik [Mo, 1973], p.175, in order to account for DC (The Model of Intensional 
M ereology) introduces two sorts of parts, part’ and part’’. 
‘(i) x is a part' of A =x has A as a property,+ and both x and A are Forms; furthermore, 
A does not have x as one of its properties. (E.g. an art is a part' of the Form of Art, and 
even more revealingly - as attested by Sophist 257c7ff -the parts' of the Form of 
Science are the various sciences.) 
(ii) x is a part" of A and an 'eidos' of A =A is a Form and x is a kind of A. (E.g. 
acquisitive art is a kind of art, so is productive art or image-making art; these are not 
arts themselves like angling, sophistry, etc. but kinds of arts and thus parts" of the 
Form of Art.)’ 
‘The part" relation is transitive while the part' relation is not.’ 
He then describes division and collection in terms of these two types of parts. 
‘A division consists of taking a generic Form and dividing or cutting it into a series of 
parts", and at the end of such a process we reach some particular part'. This part' of 
the generic Form is also a part' of the various parts" of the generic Form; this fact is 
expressed by the final definite description produced of the art in question, e.g. 
sophistry.’ 
 ‘A collection consists of taking some parts' of A and showing that they are also parts' 
of a part" of A. That is to say, in a collection we show that several instances of the 
Form of art have some significant common feature and thus belong to a kind of art.’  
Thus each division step, save the last one, is a division of a part’’ into two parts’’; in 
the last division step, a part’’ is divided into a part’’ and the final part’; and the 
collection is a (set-theoretic) collection of parts’ into a part’’. 
 
The standard interpretations, such as  given by S, Kutcharski [Ku, 1960], Miller [Mi, 
1980], Scodel [Sc, 1987], Dorter [Do, 1994], Rosen [Ros, 1995], Rowe [Row, 1995], 
Lane [Lan, 198], Castoriadis [Ca, 1999], to name some of the most prominent, have 
very little in common with our mathematical analysis, in particular there is no sign or 
suspicion, in their interpretations, that periodic anthyphairesis plays any role.  
On the contrary all existing interpretations conceive of Division and as a Linnaeus 
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type division, strictly of finite length, essentially the same as Aristotle’s divisions into 
genus and diferentia, and present no satisfactory explanation of Collection and Logos. 
 
Most scholars of Plato, perhaps because of their difficulty to understand the method of 
Division and Collection, have argued that the theories of Knowledge that Plato 
describes in earlier dialogues (Menon, Phaedo, Politeia), namely the hypothetical 
method and the method by recollection, are different from the method of Diivision 
and Collection. However this is not correct. The method of recollection co-exists with 
Division and Collection in the Phaedrus 249b-c; the hypotheses are being divided in 
the Phaedo 107b; and the method in the Politeia is ‘anairousa’ (533c-d), quite 
possibly ‘dividing’, the hypotheses and makes the practitioner of the method, the 
dialectician ‘sunoptikos’ (537c7), namely applying Collection. The method of 
Recollection is naturally and simply explained in terms of the Logos Criterion for 
periodicity of the Collection: the Logos Criterion can be thought off as a recollection 
of the earlier Logos. The anthyphairetic interpretation opens the way for a satisfying 
unified interpretation of all the Platonic dialogues. 
Ryle’s low regard of Division and Collection contrasts with his high regard with the 
‘meat’ in the Sophistes ‘clumsy sandwich’ and with the second hypothesis of the 
Parmenides. However, the whole of Sophistes is based on Division and Collection; 
and the One in the second Parmenides hypothesis has both ‘name’ and ‘logos’ (155d-
e), another way of describing Division and Collection, and is in fact wholly based on 
Division and Collection and periodic anthyphairesis. 
 
On the other side, a few students of Plato have detected in some parts of Plato’s 
writings some direct or indirect connection with the arithmetic/geometric concept of 
anthyphairesis. To my knowledge, they are the following: 
 
--Toeplitz [Toe, 1925]  
stated that incommensurability must have played an important role in Plato’s 
philosophy, but as far as I know he did not elaborate on his insight; 
--Taylor [Tay, 1926] and D'Arcy W. Thompson Tho, 1929], 
saw a connection between the (anthyphairetic) side and diameter numbers and the 
Excess and Defect described in the Epinomis; no wider implications were, however, 
realized; 
--Mugler [Mug, 1948],  
sensed the connection between geometric anthyphairesis via the Theaetetus 147-8 
mathematical passage, and the Sophistes’ Division and Collection, but in a defective 
way; Cherniss [Ch, 1951], in his book review ‘demolished’ Mugler’s approach, but 
for the wrong reasons; 
--Vuillemin [Vu, 2001],  
sensed correctly that Platonic Division and Collection is related to periodic 
anthyphairesis, though the connection he envisaged was not the correct one. In 
addition; and, 
--Fowler [Fow, 1986],  
suggested that anthyphairesis was important in Plato’s Academy, but has not 
explained in which way.  
 
But these views remained decidedly marginal; researchers like Mugler and Vuillemin 
were unable to convince Platonists of the importance of anthyphairesis in Plato’s 
work, while, conversely, Platonists were—and still are—unable to grasp that the 
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Platonic method of Division and Connection describes Platonic Being. In my opinion, 
this double failure is due to the failure to understand the manner in which Collection 
turns the infinitely many parts of the anthyphairetic Division into an entity that 
deserves to be called One, and thus be a convincing Platonic Idea (cf. Section 14, 
below).  
 
A preliminary outline of some of the basic ideas in my interpretation was given in [N, 2000]. 
Penrose has included some information on my interpretation in [Pe, 2004], pp. 54-59, 69. 
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13. A reconstruction of the proof of the palindromic periodicity of  
the anthyphairesis of commensurable in power only lines employing 
methods only from the Theaetetean Book X. of Euclid’s Elements 
 
 
The whole content of the Politicus is revealed to be nothing else but an exact 
philosophical imitation of the highly nontrivial theorem, stating, as mentioned in 
Section 7, that  
‘the anthyphairesis of two lines incommensurable in power only is palindromically 
periodic’,  
equivalently, in modern terms, 
‘the continued fraction expansion of a quadratic irrational is palindromically 
periodic’,  
a theorem thought to have been established in the modern era with fundamental 
contributions by some of the greatest mathematicians of the 17th and 18th century, 
including Euler (who gathered important experimental evidence on the periodicity of 
the continued fractions of particular quadratic irrationals), Lagrange (who proved the 
eventual periodicity), Legendre, and Galois (who characterised the purely periodic 
continued fractions, a result that easily implies the palindromic periodicity result). 
Modern proofs of this result can be found in [HW, 1938], [W, 1984] [Ka, 1985], 
[Fow, 1986].  
 
The unmistakable and necessary consequence of our analysis is that, despite the lack 
of any explicit ancient mathematical evidence, this theorem was in possession of the 
Academy. Our next question is necessarily mathematical: Could the ancient Greek 
mathematicians, and specifically Theaetetus, obtain a proof of  
                              
The Palindromic periodicity Theorem. Let α>β be two lines, Ν a non-square 
number with α2=Ν β2
[μ1, period(Ι1,Ι2,…,Ιk-1,(Ik), Ik-1,…,I2,I1, 2μ1)].  
. Then there exist numbers μ1, Ι1, Ι2,…,Ιk, such that τηε 
anthyphairesis of α, β is palindromically periodic, and in fact equal to 
More generally, the same conclusion is valid for the case where α, β are lines 
commensurable in power only.  
 
Note that both Cases actually occur. Indeed  
the anthyphairesis of α,β, with α2=46 β2
the anthyphairesis of α,β, with α
, is [6, period(1,3,1,1,2,6,2,1,1,3,1,12)], and 
2=13 β2
 
, is [3, period(1,1, 1,1,6]). 
Prompted by the clear, albeit in philosophical cover, statement of this theorem in the 
Politicus, as we saw in Sectionς 11-12, and even though there is no preserved ancient 
mathematical proof or even statement of this theorem, we next realise, that 
nevertheless all the tools for proving it can be found in the Theaetetean Book X. of 
the Elements.  
 
We emphasise that our reconstruction is based solely on tools from Book X. of the 
Elements, but assumes a historical relevance only in connection with our discovery of 
this theorem hidden in philosophic language in the Politicus.     
 
13.1. The mathematical tools from the Theaetetean Book X. of the Elements (and 
the Theaetetean theory of proportion reported in the Topics), used for the 
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reconstruction of the palindromic periodicity theorem 
 
We now make a complete list of the tools that will be used for the reconstruction of 
the proof of the palindromic periodicity theorem. These tools, with the exception of 
the Topics definition of proportion in terms of equality of anthyphairesis (which must 
be credited in part to Theodorus, who used its Corollary, the Logos Criterion in the 
reconstruction in Section V, and in greater part to Theaetetus), are all contained in the 
Theaetetean Book X.  
The definitions of commensurability and incommensurability appear in definition 1, 
while the fundamental definition of commensurability in power only appears in 
definition 2 of Book X. of the Elements. Of course commensurability in power only 
appears explicitly in the beginning of the Platonic trilogy, in the Theaetetus passage 
147d-148d, considered in Sections 4,5, 8), and credited to Theaetetus (and younger 
Socrates), and implicitly in philosophic form (as we saw in Section 12) in the 
Politicus. 
The ancient concept equivalent to the modern concept of continued fraction expansion 
of (positive) reals is anthyphairesis of two homogeneous magnitudes; this concept is 
implicitly defined in the Elements, in the course of Propositions X.2 and X.3 (in the 
same way that the Euclidean algorithm  for natural numbers is implicitly defined in 
the course of Propositions VII.1,2. 
 
In order to fix the notation we will consider the anthyphairesis of two lines α>β: 
α   =  μ1β + γ1, with β>γ1, 
β   =  I1γ1 +γ2, with γ1>γ2, 
γ1   = I2γ2 +γ3, with γ2>γ3, 
… 
γn    = In+1 γn+1+ γn+2, with γn+1 >γn+2, 
… 
 
Definition (Increment factors of the anthyphairetic remainders).  
Let α>β  be two lines, with  
α>β>γ1>γ2>γ3>…>γn>γn+1>…  
the sequence of successive remainders. We define the sequence (φn) of increment 
factors by the relations:  
φ1=γ1, and γn-1.φn = β.γn  for n> 1. 
 
Thus φn is the fourth proportional of the three lines γn, β, and γn-1. 
 
Proposition 1 (Properties of the increment factors).  
Let α>β be two lines, with  
α>β>γ1>γ2>γ3>…>γn>γn+1>… 
the sequence of successive remainders, 
μ1, I1, I2, I3,…, In, In+1,…. 
the sequence of successive quotients, and  
φ1, φ2,…, φn,… 
the sequence of linearized remainders  
of the anthyphairesis of α, β. Then 
(a) φn<β for every n, 
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(b) φn (In β+φn+1)=β2
(c) the anthyphairesis of β, φn is equal to Anth(b, φn) = [In, In+1,…] for every n, and 
 for  every n, 
(d) [Incremental Logos Criterion] if there exist n, m with n<m, such that φn=φm, then 
the anthyphairesis of α, β is eventually periodic, and in fact equal to  
[μ1, I1,…, In-1, period(In, In+1,…, Im-1)].  
 
Proof. (a), (b) routine translation of the definition of anthyphairesis of magnitudes, 
implicit  in Proposition X.2 of the Elements;  
(c) by the Topika Definition of proportion;  
(d) routine translation of the Logos Criterion (established in Section 8). 
Definitions. Let β be an assumed line, ζ, η lines with ζ>η, incommensurable, and such 
that ζ2, η2 are commensurable to β2. Then 
(a) (given in Proposition X.73 of the Elements) the line ζ-η is called an apotome 
(‘apotome’) line;  
(b) (given in Proposition X.36 of the Elements) the line ζ+η  is called line of two 
names (‘ek duo onomaton’); and, 
(c) (implicitly given in Propositions X.112-114 of the Elements) the apotome line ζ-η 
and the line of two names ζ+η  are called conjugate to each other.  
The lines ζ, η are called the names of the lines ζ-η and ζ+η. 
We write ζ+η=(ζ-η)* and ζ-η=(ζ+η)*.  
 
The following, immediately verifiable, statement is nevertheless the basic link 
between anthyphairesis and the theory of irrational lines of Book X., introduced by 
Theaetetus.  
 
Proposition 2. The line φ1=α-μ1ρ is an apotome. 
 
The conjugacy between the lines of two names and the apotomae is described in the 
fundamental Propositions X.112-114 of the Elements. 
 
Proposition X.112. If β is a rational line, ζ is a line of two names, with names ζ1>ζ2, 
and η is a line such that ζ.η = β2, then η is an apotome with names η1>η2, and 
ζ1/η1=ζ2/η2 is a commensurable ratio. 
 
Proposition X.113. If β is a rational line, ζ is an apotome, with names ζ1>ζ2, and η is 
a line such that ζ.η=β2, then η is a line of two names with names η1>η2, and 
ζ1/η1=ζ2/η2 is a commensurable ratio. 
 
Proposition X.114. If ζ is a line of two names, with names ζ1>ζ2, η is an apotome  
with names η1>η2,  ζ1/η1=ζ2/η2 is a commensurable ratio, and η.ζ=β2, then β is a 
rational line. 
 
In these three Propositions Theaetetus develops the conjugacy of the two types of 
lines (apotome, of two names) he has introduced; this conjugacy plays in effect the 
same role that conjugation plays in complex numbers: it is useful in computing 
inverses, a computation that is vital for the continued fraction expansions. The 
reconstruction of the proof of the palindromic periodicity theorem uses solely the 
concepts of the lines apotome and of two names, and their conjugacy as stated in 
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Propositions 112-14 of Book X. of the Elements. 
 
 
13.2. The tools of Book X are sufficient to carry Euler-type computations on 
anthyphairetic computations on ‘powers’. 
 
Before embarking on the proof of the Periodicity and Palindromicity Theorems it is 
instructive to get a feeling of the importance of the conjugacy of the binomial and the 
apotome lines in the anthyphairesis of quadratic irrationals, by translating the 
calculations performed by Euler, in computing the continued fraction expansion of his 
favorite quadratic irrational, into the language of the tools of Book X. of the Elements, 
i.e. considering them from Theaetetus viewpoint (cf. [Fow, 1986], pp. 322-323). 
Let us note that the importance of these propositions has not really been realized, e.g. 
by Heiberg, as it appears from Heath’s comments in [Hea, 1926], p. 246, which 
however are in the right direction: 
“Heiberg considers that this proposition and the succeeding ones are interpolated, 
though the interpolation must have taken place before Theon’s time. His argument is 
that X.112-115 are nowhere used. 
 
It seems to me that [Propositions X.112-114] that they are so connected…. But 
X.112-114 show us how either of them (binomial straight line, apotome) can be used 
to rationalize the other, thus giving what is surely an important relation between 
them.’ 
 
Weil [W, 1984] (p.15), evidently not aware of Plato’s association with periodic 
anthyphairesis,  writes: ‘Not only is Euclid himself well aware of the relation 
(√r +√s) (√r-√s) =r-s 
but even the identity 
1/(√s+√r) = √r/(r-s) -√s/(r-s) 
may be regarded as the essential content of prop. 112 of that book. Unfortunately, 
Euclid's motivation in Book X seems to have been the wish to construct a general 
framework for the theory of regular polygons and polyhedra, and not, as modern 
mathematicians would have it, an algebraic theory of quadratic fields. So we are left 
to speculate idly whether, in antiquity or later, identities involving square roots may 
not have been used, at least heuristically, in arithmetical work.’ 
 
Euler [E, 1765] calculations  
on continued fraction expansions of 
quadratic irrationals 
Corresponding  calculations  
on anthyphairetic expansions  
of ‘powers’, 
employing the tools of  
Book X. of Euclid’s  Elements  
√54 α2= 54β2 
First division step 
μ1=integral part of √54 =7 μ1=7 
x1=√54 -7 [first anthyphairetic remainder γ1=φ1] 
φ1=α- 7β.  
The first anthyphairetic remainder φ1 
is an apotome 
Second division step 
y1= 1/(√54 -7)=(√54 +7)/5 [inversion and conjugation] 
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Let ψ1 be the  line inverse to the apotome 
φ1, namely the line that satisfies 
φ1.ψ1= β2. 
The fact that φ1 is an apotome allows for 
the exact computation of the inverse line 
ψ1. 
Let φ1* be the line of two names 
conjugate to φ1, namely φ1*=α-+7β. 
By conjugation (Proposition X.112) 
φ1.φ1*=α2-49β2=54b2-49β2=5β2. 
Comparison of ψ1 and φ1* yields 
immediately 
5 ψ1 =α-+7β. 
Thus ψ1 is a line of two names.  
I1=integral part of 14/5=2 [inversion and anthyphairesis] 
We compare  
φ1.ψ1=β2 (inversion), and 
φ1.(I1 β+φ2)= β2 (increment factor). 
hence ψ1=I1 β+φ2.  
Since φ2< β, and 5 ψ1 =α-+7β, 
It follows that  
I1 is the integral part of 14/5,  
namely I1=2. 
x2= (√54 -3)/5 [increment factor φ2] 
hence α+ μβ=5(2 β+φ2),  
hence 5φ2=α- 3β, 
φ2 is an apotome  
Third division step 
y2=5/(√54 -3) =5(√54 +3)/45 = (√54 +3)/9 
 
[inversion and conjugation] 
φ2.ψ2=β2, thus 9ψ2=α+ 3β 
thus ψ2 is the line of two names 
inverse to the apotome φ2,  
found by employing Proposition X.112 
I2= integral part of 10/9=1 [inversion and anthyphairesis] 
We compare  
φ2.ψ2=β2 (inversion), and 
φ2.(I2 β+φ3)= β2 (increment factor). 
hence ψ2=I2 β+φ3.  
Since φ3< β, and 9ψ2=α+ 3β 
I2 is the integral part of 10/9,  
namely I2=1. 
x3=(√54- 6)/9 [increment factor φ3] 
hence α+ 3β=9(β+φ3),  
hence 9φ3=α- 6β, 
The increment factor φ3 is an apotome 
Fourth division step 
y3=9/(√54-6)=9(√54+6)/18=(√54 +6)/2 [inversion and conjugation] 
φ3.ψ3=β2, thus 2ψ3=α+ 6β 
thus ψ3 is the line of two names 
inverse to the apotome φ3,  
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found by employing Proposition X.112 
I3=6 [inversion and anthyphairesis] 
We compare  
φ3.ψ3=β2 (inversion), and 
φ3.(I3 β+φ4)= β2 (increment factor). 
hence ψ3=I3 β+φ4.  
Since φ4< β,  
I3 is the integral part of 13/2, namely 
I3=6. 
x4=(√54 - 6)/2 [increment factor φ4] 
hence α+ 6β=2(6β+φ4),  
hence 2φ4=α- 6β, 
The increment factor φ4 is an apotome 
Fifth division step 
y4=2/(√54 -6)=2(√54 +6)/18=(√54 +6)/9 [inversion and conjugation] 
φ4.ψ4=β2, thus 9ψ4=α+ 6β 
thus ψ4 is the line of two names 
inverse to the apotome φ4,  
found by employing Proposition X.112 
I4=1 [inversion and anthyphairesis] 
We compare  
φ4.ψ4=β2 (inversion), and 
φ4.(I4 β+φ5)= β2 (increment factor). 
hence ψ4=I4 β+φ5.  
Since φ5< β,  
I4 is the integral part of 13/9, namely 
I4=1. 
Thus ψ4=β+φ5. 
x5=(√54 -3)/9 [increment factor φ5] 
hence α+ 6β=9(β+φ5),  
hence 9φ5=α- 3β, 
The increment factor φ5 is an apotome 
Sixth division step 
y5=9/(√54 -3)=9(√54 +3)/45=(√54 +3)/5 [inversion and conjugation] 
φ5.ψ5=β2, thus 5ψ5=α+ 3β 
thus ψ5 is the line of two names 
inverse to the apotome φ5,  
found by employing Proposition X.112 
I5=2 [inversion and anthyphairesis] 
We compare  
φ5.ψ5=β2 (inversion), and 
φ5.(I5 β+φ6)= β2 (increment factor). 
hence ψ5=I5 β+φ6.  
Since φ6< β,  
I5 is the integral part of 10/5, namely 
I5=2. 
Thus ψ5=2β+φ6. 
x6=(√54 -7)/5 [increment factor φ6] hence α+ 
3β=5(2β+φ6),  
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hence 5φ6=α- 7β, 
The increment factor φ6 is an apotome 
Seventh division step 
y6=5/(√54 -7)=5(√54 +7)/5=√54 +7 [inversion and conjugation] 
φ6.ψ6=β2, thus ψ6=α+ 7β 
thus y6 is the line of two names 
inverse to the apotome φ6,  
found by employing Proposition X.112 
I6=14 [inversion and anthyphairesis] 
We compare  
φ6.ψ6=β2 (conjugacy), and 
φ6.(I6β+φ7)= β2 (increment factor). 
hence ψ6=I6 β+φ7.  
Since φ7< β,  
I6 is the integral part of 14, namely I6=14. 
Thus ψ6=14β+φ7. 
x7=√54 -7 [increment factor φ7] hence α+ 
7β=14β+φ7,  
hence φ7=α- 7β, 
The increment factor φ7 is an apotome 
Logos Criterion 
x7=x1, periodicity φ7=φ1, periodicity  
by the incremental Logos criterion 
Hence the continued fraction expansion 
of √54 is equal to 
 [7, period(2,1,6,1,2,14)]. 
Hence the anthyphairesis of α, β,  
with α2= 54β2,  is equal to  
[7, period(2,1,6,1,2,14)]. 
 
13.3. The proof of the Periodicity Theorem with the tools of Book X of the 
Elements 
 
We now turn to the proof of the Theorem, and present first the proof of the weaker  
 
The periodicity theorem (PT).  
If N is a non-square natural number, and α and β straight lines, such that α2=Nβ2, 
denoting by  
μ1, I1, I2,…, In,…  
the sequence of successive quotients, by  
φ1, φ2,…, φn,…  
the sequence of successive increment factors.  
of the anthyphairesis of α with respect to β,  
then there are two sequences  
λ1(=1), λ2,…, λk,… and μ1, μ2,…, μk,…  
of natural numbers, such that for every natural number k>1 
(ak) λkλk -1=Ν- μk -12, 
(bk) λk (Ik -1 β +φk)= λk -1 (φk -1)*, 
(ck) μk+μk -1=Ik -1λk,  
hence λk is a natural number smaller than N, and μk is a natural number whose square 
is smaller than N, and 
(dk) the line φk is an apotome and in fact λk  φk=α-μk β; and 
the anthyphairesis of α and β is eventually periodic. 
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Proof of the periodicity theorem.  
We proceed by mathematical induction. 
 We prove (a2), (b2),(c2), (d2) and  
assuming  (ak), (bk),(ck), (dk) we prove (ak +1), (bk +1),(ck +1), (dk +1). 
 
The proof of (ak +1) consists in the elementary verification, using ((dk), (ak), (ck)), that 
the number λk +1 defined by λk -1+Ik -1(μk -1- μk) is indeed a natural number. 
 
Proof of (bk +1): the equality (dk)  λk φk=α-μk β implies that φk is an apotome line. We 
consider the line of two names λk  (φk)*=α+μk β conjugate to it; by  
(ak +1) and Proposition X.114, we obtain that 
           λk 2 φk (φk)* =(α-μk β) (α+μk β) = α2-μk 2 β2 = λk +1λk  β2, 
whence, dividing both sides by λk , that 
λk 
 φk (φk)* = λk +1 β2.                                                                       (A) 
On the other hand, from the anthyphairetic relation (Proposition 1b) we obtain 
φk (Ik β+φk +1)=β2, hence 
            λk +1φk (Ik  β+φk +1) = λk +1β2 .                                                                                                               (B) 
Comparing (A) and (B), we get that λk+1φk (Ik  β+φk+1)=λk φk (φk)*, hence 
            λk +1(Ik  β+φk +1)=λk  (φk)*. 
 
Assuming that (bk +1) has been proved: 
the proof of (ck +1) consists in the elementary verification, using ((bk +1) and 
Proposition 1a), that the number μk +1 defined by Ik λk +1- μk  is indeed a natural 
number; and, 
the proof of (dk +1) consists in an elementary verification, using (bk +1) and (ck +1). 
 
The similar and simpler proof of (b2), relying on the conjugacy of Book X. 
(Proposition X.114), is left for the reader.                                         
 
The proof of (ak), (bk),(ck), (dk) is now complete. 
 
From (ak), (bk),(ck), (dk)  just proved, and from the fact that the set of pairs (λ, μ) οf 
natural numbers, with λ bounded above by N and μ by  μ1  is finite, it follows, by an 
application of  the pigeonhole principle, that there are indices k and s, with k<s, such 
that φk=φs. The eventual periodicity now follows from the incremental Logos criterion 
(Proposition 1d). 
 
13.4. The proof of the palindromic periodicity theorem with the tools of Book X 
of the Elements 
We next proceed with the proof of the full theorem on palindromic periodicity, 
described in the Politicus. 
Definition (Inverse of the conjugate (φn)*). Define the line ωn by the equality  
(φn)* ωn =β2. 
Since (φn)* is a line of two names, it follows from Book X. conjugacy (Proposition 
X.112) that ωn is an apotome. In fact we can obtain more detailed information. 
Proposition 3 (Properties of ωn).  
(a) The line ωn is an apotome, and in fact  
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λn +1 ωn=α-μn β; 
(b) ωn <β; 
(c) ω1(φ 1+2μ1 β)=β2; and,  
(d) ωn +1 (Ιn β+ωn )=β2.  
Proof. (a) by the definition of  ωn  and PT(=Periodicity Theorem) (an), (dn); 
(b) by the definition of  ωn  and PT (cn); 
(c) by the definition of  ω1 and φ1; and, 
(d) by the definition of ωn and  PT (dn+2). 
 
The details are left for the reader. 
Proof of the palindromic periodicity theorem.  
Order the elements of the two sequences (φn) and (ωn) in one as follows:  
φ1, ω1, φ2, ω2,…, φn, ωn,… .  
From the pigeonhole principle, using the Periodicity Theorem and Proposition 3a, 
there exists a first element in the sequence so ordered, such that 
(i) all the previous elements of the sequence are pairwise distinct, and 
(ii) the element in question coincides with a previous element.  
 
There are two cases to examine: 
Case I: The elements φ1, ω1, φ2, ω2,…, φk-1, ωk-1 are pairwise distinct and the element 
φk coincides with a previous element. Then we claim that ωk-1=φk . 
Case II: The elements φ1, ω1, φ2, ω2,…, φk -1, ωk -1, φk are pairwise distinct and the 
element ωk coincides with a previous one. Then we claim that φk =ωk.  
 
Proof for Case I. There are three subcases: 
 
(a) if the apotome line φk coincides with the apotome line φ1, then we have 
contradiction [Proof similar to (b) below] 
 
(b) if the apotome line φk coincides with the apotome line φj  for some j with 1<j<k, 
then we have contradiction. 
[we are to obtain a contradiction from (b). 
From the supposition it follows that the two conjugate lines of two names are equal, 
i.e. that (φk)*=(φl)*, and since (φk)* ωk=(φj)* ωj=β2 (by the definition of (φk)*), we 
obtain that ωk=ωj. But we have ωj (Ij -1 β+ωj -1)=β2and ωk (Ik -1 β+ωk -1)=β2 (both by 
Proposition 3d). Hence Ik-1 β+ωk-1= Ij-1 β+ωj-1; since (on account of Proposition 3b) 
both sides of the equation represent the anthyphairetic division of the same whole line 
with respect to the same line β, it follows that the remainders are equal, i.e. ωk-1=ωj-1, 
a contradiction, since the elements  φ1, ω1, φ2, ω2,…, φk-1, ωk-1 have been assumed to 
be pairwise different. Hence φk  is not equal to φj  for some j with 1<j<k.] 
 
(c) if the apotome line φk coincides with the apotome line ωj, for some j with j<k-1, 
then we have contradiction.[Proof similar to (b) above]. 
 
Therefore, since φk is equal with one of the elements φ1, ω1, φ2, ω2,…, φk-1, ωk-1,  the 
only possibility left, by (a), (b), and (c), is to have ωk-1=φk.  
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Case II is dealt with similarly and we obtain φk =ωk. 
 
We now complete the proof by showing the palindromicity in Case I. 
 
From the fact, already proved, that ωk-1= φk, and the relations φk (Ιkβ+φk+1)=β2 
(Proposition 1b) and ωk -1 (Ιk-2 β+ωk-2)=β2 (Proposition 3d), we deduce that  
Ιk β+φk +1= Ιk-2 β+ωk-2;  
since (on account of Propositions 1a and 3b) both sides of this equation represent the 
anthyphairetic division of the same whole line with respect to the same line β, it 
follows that the two remainders and the two quotients are equal, i.e. Ιk=Ιk-2 and   
φk+1= ωk-2 .  
Continuing in the same way we obtain that Ιk+1=Ιk-3 and φk +2= ωk 3. Still continuing in 
the same way we obtain that Ι1=Ι2k -3 and φ2k +2= ω1. But we have that  
 φ2k -2(Ι2k -2 β+φ2k -1)=β2 (Proposition 1b) and ω1(2μ1β+φ1 )=β2 (Proposition 3d); hence  
Ι2k -2 β+φ2k -1 =2μ1β+φ1. Since (on account of Proposition 1a) both sides of this 
equation represent the anthyphairetic division of the same whole line with respect to 
the same line β, it follows that the two remainders and the two quotients are equal, i.e. 
Ι2k -2=2μ1 and  φ2k -1= φ1.  
From the equality φ2k -1= φ1 (the incremenal Logos criterion (Proposition 1d)), we 
deduce the periodicity of the anthyphairesis, and from the equalities  
Ι2k -2=2μ1, and Ι1=Ι2k -3,  Ι2=Ι2k -4,…, Ιk=Ιk -2 , and Ιk+1=Ιk -3, 
we deduce the palindromicity in the period of the anthyphairesis, as required. 
 
Case II is dealt with similarly.  
 
The general commensurability in power only requires only minor modifications left to 
the reader. The proof of the theorem is complete. 
 
13.5. Plato’s argument for going from the Kronos era to the Zeus era (Politicus 
272d-e)  appears to be related to the pigeonhole argument employed in the proof.  
 
It will be seen that in the reconstructed proof of the palindromic periodicity theorem, 
the pigeonhole principle is crucially employed precisely at the point of passing from 
the first semiperiod to the second and palindromically symmetric to the first. This of 
course corresponds precisely to the point of passing from the Kronos era to the Zeus 
era. As noted in Section 11.3, and footnote 22, Plato, in explaining why there comes a 
time when there is necessarily a change from the Kronos era to the Zeus era (in the 
Politicus 272d-e), gives an argument that seems reminiscent of a pigeonhole 
argument: 
‘For when the time of all these [states] was completed (‘eteleiothe’) and the change 
was to take place, and all the earth-born genus had already been used up 
(‘aneloto’), since every soul falling into the earth had fulfilled (‘apodedokuias’) all 
the generations, as many seeds as prescribed to it, then the heldsman of the universe 
dropped the tiller and withdrew to his place of outlook, and fate and innate desire 
made the universe turn backwards.’33
                                                 
33 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντων τούτων χρόνος ἐτελεώθη καὶ μεταβολὴν ἔδει γίγνεσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γήινον ἤδη 
πᾶν ἀνήλωτο γένος, πάσας ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδεδωκυίας, ὅσα ἦν ἑκάστῃ προσταχθὲν 
τοσαῦτα εἰς γῆν σπέρματα πεσούσης 
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Thus change for a soul from the Kronos earthborn era to the Zeus era becomes  
necessary when the (definitely finite) number of generations of the soul in this era 
have all been used up and the seeds prescribed to the soul in this era have been; this is 
precisely the pigeonhole argument.  
 
 
13.6. The purpose of Book X of the Elements 
 
Book X. is thus revealed to have a most exciting purpose: supplying the tools for the 
statement and proof of the palindromic periodicity of the anthyphairesis of the 
quadratic irrationals. This purpose was hitherto unsuspected, as can be seen by 
opinions expressed by authors who have studied Book X., such as: 
Taisbak ([Tai, 1982], p.58), who must be credited with demystifying the mathematical 
structure of Book X., writes: “We are prepared to face the possibility that there was 
no other point than to entertain us with good logic”; 
Knorr ([Kn, 1983], p. 60), who writes: “The true merit of Book X, and I believe it is 
no small one, lies in its being a unique specimen of a fully elaborated deductive 
system of the sort that ancient philosophies consistently prized”; 
Mueller ([Mu, 1981], pp. 270-271), who writes: “One would, of course, prefer an 
explanation that invoked a clear mathematical goal intelligible to us in terms of our 
own notions of mathematics and which, under analysis, would lead univocally to the 
reasoning in book X. Unfortunately, book X has never been explicated successfully in 
this way nor does it appear amenable to explication of this sort. Rather, book X 
appears to be expedient for dealing with a particular problem and at the same time a 
mathematical blind alley”; 
van dr Waerden ([vdW, 1950], p. 172), who writes: “ Book X does not make easy 
reading…The author succeeded admirably in hiding his line of thought”. 
 
On the other hand, the ‘fine structure’ of Book X., involving the detailed study of the 
six lines of two names and the six apotomai has no role in the proof of the 
palindromic periodicity theorem, and its purpose is still an open question. It will be 
analysed in a forthcoming work by Negrepontis and Brokou [NB, ?]. 
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14. A Platonic Idea is an Anthyphairetic Self-Similar One  
 
There is a final question that must be answered, in order to consider the interpretation 
given in the present work fully satisfying. The question is: why would Plato want to 
place periodic anthyphairesis at the very center of his philosophic system? What was 
he expecting from periodic anthyphairesis?  
We already saw that by identifying Platonic Ideas with the philosophic analogue of a 
Theaetetean mixture he succeeded in making the Ideas knowable to humans by the 
method of Division and Collection.  
The second advantage of periodic anthyphairesis is that it possesses an infinite 
sequence of anthyphairetic approximations, namely of rational approximations whose 
finite anthyphairesis is a finite initial segment of the infinite anthyphairesis of the 
Platonic Idea.Thus the anthyphairetic model of an Idea provides approximations,the 
sensible, that may credibly be described as copies or idols of, or participants into, the 
original Idea.  Sensibles are expanded by Plato mostly in the Timaeus. As already 
noted we are not going to deal with sensible in the present work. 
 
But the main property of a Platonic Idea that Plato obtains from the model of periodic 
anthyphairesis is its Oneness. In fact an entity possessing periodic anthyphairesis is a 
One, a Monad, in the best possible sense, that of self-similarity. We will then describe 
in some detail the precise sense in which a Platonic Idea or Being may be regarded as 
a One, as promised in Section 1. 
 
14.1. What kind of a One for the Platonic Idea?  
 
Plato distinguishes two states of Beings in the Sophistes 255c-d: the more exalted 
‘Being itself’ and a more lowly Being ‘with respect to’ (‘pros ti’), a relative Being, a 
Being in the form of a ratio, an Idea, according to our foregoing analysis. Only the 
latter is accessible and knowable to the human intellect, and we are here concerned 
exclusively with this Being. It is clear that, for Plato, the principal property of a 
Platonic Being—variously described as a One or a Unity, as simple, partless or 
indivisible—is precisely its Oneness. But what kind of Oneness? 
 
14.2. The types of One rejected for a Platonic Being 
 
(1) A Platonic Being is not the absolutely partless One.  
 
The Absolute One, the One without any parts whatsoever, the really partless and 
indivisible One which corresponds to the One of the first hypothesis (137c-142a) in 
the Parmenides, is explicitly rejected as Being (especially in 141e3-142a1). In this 
rejection, Plato follows Zeno, as in Fragment B2. 
 
(2) A Platonic Being is not the cumulative One.  
 
Cornford ([Co, 1932]; [Co,1935]; [Co,1939]) thought that Collection is just the 
inverse of Division: he believed we could obtain the initial Genus by summing all the 
pieces of a Division together (cf. Section 12.5). But there are serious problems with 
this interpretation of Collection, and the corresponding interpretation of a Platonic 
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Being as a One that is simply the sum of an infinity of parts, a summed into a totality. 
To begin with, there is no periodicity involved in such a Collection, although, as we 
note in Section 8, every Platonic description of Collection stresses its periodic nature. 
Secondly, the type of Collection suggested by Cornford is explicitly rejected both in 
the Parmenides 128e-130a (especially 129c4-d6 given in 5(c), below) and in the 
Philebus 14d-e, as describing sensible and not intelligible entities: 
 
‘and this sort of thing also should be disregarded, when a man in his talk dividing the 
members, and at the same time the parts, of anything, acknowledges that they all collectively 
are that one thing’34
 
 (Philebus 14e). 
14.3. A Platonic Idea is described as a self-similar One in the Sophistes and in the 
second hypothesis of the Parmenides  
 
At first sight, infinite divisibility seems to make a mockery of—and to run against—
any decent notion of One, as it produces an infinite number of parts, namely the 
remainders at each stage of the division process. But as it is made clear in the 
Sophistes 244d-245b, 257c, 258e, the Parmenides 129c-d, and the Parmenides 
Second Hypothesis, divisibility is no obstacle for Oneness, specifically for self-similar 
Oneness in which every part is the same as the whole:  
 
‘But yet nothing hinders (‘ouden apokoluei’) that which has parts (‘to memerismenon’) from 
possessing the attribute of unity (‘to pathos …tou henos’) in all its parts (‘en tois meresin 
pasin’), and in this way every Being and Whole (‘pan te on kai holon’) to be One (‘hen’)’19 
(Sophistes 245a1-3); 
 
‘but what is surprising if someone shall show that I am one and many (‘hen kai polla’)? When 
he wishes to show that I am many, he says that my right side is one thing and my left another, 
that my front is different from my back, and my upper body in like manner different from my 
lower; for I suppose I have a share of multitude. To show that I am one, he‘ll say I am one 
man among the seven of us, since I also have a share of the one. So he shows both are true. 
Now, if someone should undertake to show that sticks and stones and things like that are 
many, and the same things one, we’ll grant that he has proved that something is many and 
one (‘polla kai hen’), but not that the one is many (‘to hen polla’) or the many one (‘ta polla 
hen’): he has said nothing out of the ordinary, but a thing on which we all agree.’ 
(Parmenides 129c4-d6); 
 
‘there are infinitely many parts of Being’ (Parmenides 144b6-7), ‘to each of the parts of 
Being befits the One’ (ibid. 144c6),‘neither the being is lacking in relation to the one, nor the 
one in relation to the being, but they are equalized being two for ever in all ways’ (ibid. 
144e1-3).35
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Based on Plato, Statesman, Philebus, translated by H.N. Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1925. 
35 translation based on Allen [Al. 1997]. 
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14.4. A Platonic Idea is an Anthyphairetic Self-similar One 
 
(1) Anthyphairetic Division into an infinite multitude of parts.  
 
An Idea possesses, in analogy to a mathematical ratio of lines incommensurable in 
length only, two opposite to each other parts called powers in the Theaetetus 156a6-
b1—B1 and A1—one of which—say A1—acting and the other—B1—being acted on 
(Sophistes 247d-e); this is the Platonic entity, called by Aristotle an ‘indefinite dyad’ 
in, for example, the Metaphysics 1082a13-15, 1083b35-36.  
Examples of Platonic ‘indefinite dyads’ defining a Being are:  
{A1 beautiful, B1 not beautiful}(Sophistes 257d-e);  
{A1 great, B1 not great} and {A1 just, B1 not just}(ibid. 258a);  
{being A1, non-being B1} (ibid. 258b-c);  
{A1 self-restraint and B1 bravery}, the indefinite dyad of the Form Virtue (mentioned 
and analysed in the final section of the Politicus 305e-311c); and  
{B1 One, A1 Being}, the indefinite dyad of the Form One Being (in the second 
hypothesis of the Parmenides 142b1-143a3).  
Indefinite dyads without an explicit reference to a Platonic Idea, such as  
{cold, warm}, {fast, slow}, {more, less},  
appear in the Philebus 23b5-25e3 and are instances of the Infinite (‘apeiron’), 
interpreted in Section 3, as a philosophic form of infinite anthyphairesis.  
The initial indefinite dyad of the Ideas the Angler and the Sophist is, in each case, the 
pair of the opposite species-parts {B1, A1} produced at the first stage by dividing the 
initial genus G. 
As shown in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides 142b1-143a336
A, B, B1, A1, B2, A2,…, Bk, Ak, Bk+1, Ak+1,….  
, for the dyad 
{One, Being}, the initial infinite dyad {B1, A1} produces, by anthyphairetic division, 
the infinite sequence of parts-species  
In the abbreviated form of the Division, as it appears in the Divisions in the Sophistes 
and in the Politicus, the parts of a Platonic Being are produced by dividing the initial 
Genus G at the first stage into two species B1 and A1, one of which—the one which is 
a true predicate to the Platonic Being, A1—turns into a genus and is divided again at 
the second stage into two opposite species-parts, say B2 and A2. Because of Logos-
periodicity, the Division continues ad infinitum, producing the infinite sequence of 
parts-species. The multitude of the parts of a Platonic Idea is thus infinite. 
 
(2) Anthyphairetic Periodicity and the finite number of Logoi  
 
A Logos of a Platonic Idea is the ratio of two successive species-parts, namely 
either the ratio of the opposite species at some level, say k, Bk/Ak, or a ratio of the 
form Ak/Bk+1. Since in a Platonic Idea the Logos Criterion and the resulting 
periodicity hold true, there are natural numbers m>n, such that Bn/An=Bm/Am. Thus,  
the multitude of Logoi in a Platonic Idea is finite and consists of all the Logoi in a 
period, namely: 
 
Bn/An, An/Bn+1, Bn+1/An+1,…, Bm-1/Am-1, Am-1/Bm (and Bm/Am= Bn/An). 
                                                 
36 S. Negrepontis, The anthyphairetic interpretation of the second hypothesis in the Parmenides, 
unpublished manuscript, 2004.  
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The finiteness of the number of Logoi is clearly confirmed in Sophistes 257a4-6.  
 
(3) Equalisation of the Logoi by Periodicity 
 
The anthyphairesis of each pair of ssuccessive parts forming a Logos,  say Bk/Ak or 
Ak/Bk+1 (in the notation of (2)), is, by the philosophic analogue of the definition of the 
proportion of magnitudes, given in the Topics, periodicity, and the resulting Logos 
Criterion, the same, except that it appears in a cyclic permutation of the original dyad. 
In this way, we regard all the Logoi of a Platonic Being same and equalised to each 
other.  
 
(4) Equalization of the parts by their participation in the Logoi  
 
The fundamental property of a Platonic Being is that the two opposite parts—being a 
and non-being b—of the indefinite dyad possess the ‘power’ (247d-248d), which is 
clarified as the ‘power to communicate’ with each other (252d3, 253a8, 253e1, 254b8, 
254c5) and still further clarified to be a ‘power for equalisation with each other’ 
(257b).  
The same basic property of a Being, is described in the Politicus 305e-311c with 
regard to the Being or Form of Virtue, where the dyad a bravery and b self-restraint is 
called the Logos that defines Virtue. 
The way the two opposing parts of the indefinite dyad of a Being (and in fact any two 
successive remainders in the sequence  
a, b, a1, b1,…, ak, bk, ak+1,…  
of the anthyphairetic division) become equalised by Logos is well-explained in the 
Sophistes 257b1-260b3, especially in 257b, 257e9-258c5:  
it is by considering  
not the opposing parts themselves (which are ‘not-beings’, 256d-e, 257a),  
but the Logoi-ratios  into which they participate;  
thus, we consider  
instead of the non-being a, the Logos a/b, and  
instead of the non-being b, the Logos a/b (or b/a1) (257e2-258b5).  
and we say that the part a participates into the Logos a/b, and the part b participates in 
the Logos a/b (oe b/a1).  
Thus each part participates in a Logos, and since the Logoi have been equalised by 
periodicity, the parts are equalised by their participation into the Logoi. 
 
(5) Collection of the Many into One 
 
Now we can understand the meaning of the Colletion of the (infinitely) many into One. 
Anthyphairetic Division produces, generates an infinite multitude of parts (as stated in (1). By 
(4) each part participates in a Logos. By periodicity (2) there is a finite number of Logoi in 
cyclical permutation. By (3) all these Logoi have the same anthyphairesis except for cyclical 
permutatyion, and in this sense they are equalised. Thus by participation of parts in Logoi all 
parts are equalised. This is precisely the meaning of Platonic Collection of the Many into 
One.  
Thus, in a Platonic Idea, there is  
an infinite number of parts or ‘not-beings’ (as confirmed in 256e5-7),  
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but all parts are equalised, by participation and periodicity, in the sense of self-
similarity.37
 
 
14. 5. Platonic Numbers 
 
The self-similarity of a Platonic Idea opens up the way for the definition of Platonic 
numbers: the anthyphairetic interpretation of Platonic numbers is a natural by-product 
of the anthyphairetic interpretation of the method of Division and Collection. We 
shall briefly outline the nature of the Numbers in accordance with the anthyphairetic 
interpretation. 
These are certainly the same numbers described in Philebus 56c10-e6 (where they are 
differentiated from the numbers used by the many) and the Politeia 522c1-526c7 
(where they are differentiated from the numbers as used by, say, Agamemnon). The 
differentiation from common usage is twofold: a Platonic number consists of units 
that are (i) entirely equal to each other, and (ii) divisible into an infinite multitude of 
parts.  
The nature of these numbers is well described by Aristotle in Metaphysics 987b25-
988a1, where it is stated that: 
(a) ‘the number two consists of the two elements of an indefinite dyad, equalized 
(‘isasthenton’) by the principle of the One’ (1081a23-25, 1083b30-32, 1091a24-25),  
(b) contrary to the mathematical units, the units of the Platonic (‘eidetic’) numbers are 
equal for a fixed number, but different for different eidetic numbers (1080a23-30), 
and  
(c) the species are numbers (987b20-22).  
 
The difficulties modern Platonists have encountered in reconstructing the Platonic 
numbers according to Aristotle’s requirements has led to a downgrading of Aristotle’s 
account of Platonic numbers (misunderstanding on his part, unwritten dogmas, and so 
on). But Plato describes Platonic numbers in the second hypothesis of the 
Parmenides, and the anthyphairetic interpretation of this hypothesis, discovered by S. 
Negrepontis38
                                                 
37 Palmer [Pa, 1999] develops an interpretation of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides, according 
to which the infinite divisibility of the One Being is not an obstacle, but rather an asset, to its nature as 
a One, thanks to ‘the demonstration of the one being’s resistance to the type of division envisaged here 
via a demonstration of how its predicate parts “one” and “being” persist through every possible 
division’ (p. 225). He thus approaches the self-similar Oneness of a Platonic Being, but  taking  into 
account only the infinite divisibility (which cannot by itself produce self-similarity) and not periodicity, 
the only cause of Platonic self-similarity. 
, confirms Aristotle’s description of Platonic numbers. Thus, Plato’s 
definition of the number two in the Parmenides 144b-e as the pair of One and Being 
fully agrees with (a), since the self-similar Oneness of the Platonic Being precisely 
assures that these two successive units-species are equalized (‘exisousthon’, 144e2) 
by periodicity and Logos (or, as Aristotle calls it, the principle of the One). The units 
for forming a Platonic number are the species, numbered according to their successive 
generation in the anthyphairetic Division of the Being, precisely as in the Parmenides 
144b-e, the Philebus 16c5-17a5 and the Sophistes 258c3, where each not-being part-
species is claimed to be ‘one species among the many Beings possessing number 
(‘enarithmon’). Platonic numbers thus indeed are species, as Aristotle claims (c). The 
numbers in the Idea Sophist are the numbered species as in Table 14.5.  
38 S. Negrepontis, The anthyphairetic interpretation of the second hypothesis in the Parmenides, 
unpublished manuscript, 2004.  
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Table 14.5. The Platonic Numbers in the Platonic Idea Sophist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to this interpretation, Platonic numbers are not absolute but only relative to 
a Platonic Being: the initial unit (hence (b)). In fact, however, according to the 
Parmenides 148d5-149d7 and the Sophistes 257a4-6 (‘hosaper…tosauta’, like the 
‘tosauta hosaper’ in the Parmenides 144d5, both following the ‘tosauta…hosa’ in 
Zeno’s Fragment B3), the number of units in any Platonic Being is finite and equal to 
(the number of different Logoi)+1, this number being determined by the length of the 
period. In the case of the Sophist (Table 14.5) the different Logoi are D2/C2, C2/D3, 
D3/C3, C3/D4, D4/C4, C4/D5, while D5/C5 is equal to D2/C2, thus the number 
generated in the Platonic Idea of the Sophist is the number Seven. 
 
14.6. Dichotomic division in Division and Collection 
 
The Division steps in the Sophistes and the Politicus are almost39 invariably described 
as dichotomic divisions40
 
 clearly meaning that the division is in two equal parts, not 
simply in two, as shown by the insistence for division in half  (Sophistes 221b3), 
‘mesotomein’ (Politicus 265a4), ‘dia meson’ division (Politicus 262b6), while on the 
other hand the two species into which the given genus is being defined in no way 
appear equal (e.g. the division of all the roductive arts into divine productive arts and 
human roductive arts). The answer is that these parts are equalised by the self-
similarity explained above (14.5). Thus the statement in the Politicus that divisions 
should be perforned only by ‘mesotomein’ means that that the division should be 
performed in such a way as to ensure eventually periodicity, by means of the Logos 
Criterion, and thus ensure self-similarity and equalisation.  
                                                 
39 Every division step in the Division and Collection is a binary division. Some scholars think that this 
is no longer true in the Philebus 16d3-5 ‘εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν καὶ τῶν ἓν 
ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως’, but the passage refers to the number of units under the species, 
obtained by the Parmenides rule ‘number of units=(the number of different Logoi)+1’ (mentioned in 
14.5), a number that, as stated in the Philebus 16d3-5 assage, is the same for all species. The division is 
described, almost invariably in every step not only as a binary division but as a dichotomic one. 
40 e.g. Sophistes 221e1-3, 225a2-7, 265a10-b3, 265d5-266a3, 267a1-4; Politicus 276d8-10, 276e6-8, 
282c6-9, 287b10-c6, 302c4-11 
 
              art produced by instruments D4 (species 5) 
             mimetic art with knowledge D5 (species 7) C5 mimetic art with opinion 
   B1 productive arts 
              divine productive arts D1     C1 human productive arts  
                  art of making real things D2 (species 1)  C2 art of making images (species 2)                  
                   likeness -making arts D3 (species 3) 
  C3 fantastic art (species 4) 
C4 mimetic art (species 6) 
   simple imitator D6 C6 dissembling imitator  
   popular orator D7  C7 sophist 
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